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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 7, 2014, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors signifi-
cantly restructured the governance system for Division I institutions.1
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1. See Michelle B. Hosick, Board Adopts New Division I Structure, NCAA (Aug.
7, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-new-
division-i-structure [https://perma.cc/E4GG-JQ4H] (discussing the 16-2 vote in favor
of adopting new governance model).
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The NCAA is a private membership association of over 1,100 colleges
and universities across three divisions.2 In turn, Division I has 347
member institutions of higher education,3 and there are thirty-two
conferences across Division I.4 Division I schools typically “have the
biggest student bodies, manage the largest athletics budgets and offer
the most generous number of scholarships.”5 Division I is further
“subdivided based on football sponsorship” or lack thereof.6 The
three subgroups within Division I include the Football Bowl Subdivi-
sion (“FBS”),7 the Football Championship Subdivision (“FCS”),8 and
member schools that do not sponsor football.9 The FBS includes 129
member schools; 125 of these institutions are from ten conferences,
and the remaining four schools are independents.10 In addition, the
sixty-five schools from five FBS conferences (the Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-
12, Southeastern Conference, and Atlantic Coast Conference) com-
prise the membership of the so-called Autonomy conferences or Au-
tonomy 5.11 As Professor Jo Potuto, the Faculty Athletics
Representative (“FAR”) at the University of Nebraska has described:
2. There are 1,123 colleges and universities, ninety-eight athletics conferences,
and thirty-nine affiliated organizations that comprise the NCAA. What is the NCAA?,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa
[https://perma.cc/4EB7-6NQM] (last visited June 21, 2017).
3. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions [https://perma.cc/2H3S-RXPC] (last visited June
21, 2017).
4. See NCAA BYLAW § 4.3.4, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 2017–18 (Aug. 2017)
[hereinafter NCAA Manual 2017–2018], http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/D118.pdf [https://perma.cc/48MT-4DH3] (delineating the thirty-two
conferences).
5. NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=D1 [https://
perma.cc/C5W8-QNGN] (last visited June 21, 2017).
6. Id.
7. As the name suggests, these schools (from ten different conferences and a
handful of independents) participate in the wide array of post-season bowl games. Id.
The most successful of the schools also have the opportunity to participate in the elite
college football playoff games that annually crown a national champion. Overview,
COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, http://www.collegefootballplayoff.com/overview
[https://perma.cc/FK99-H5NN] (last visited June 21, 2017).
8. These schools from eleven different conferences are eligible to participate in
an “NCAA-run football championship.” NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about?division=D1 [https://perma.cc/9L5Q-C8FE] (last visited June 21,
2017).
9. See id. (observing that these non-football schools from eleven different confer-
ences are simply identified as Division I).
10. See FBS Football, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/standings/football/fbs [https://
perma.cc/V6SR-DQFT] (last visited June 23, 2017) (arranging the 129 member
schools by conference or by status as independents).
11. Specifically, NCAA bylaws authorize members of the Big Ten Conference, Big
12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference, Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), and Atlantic
Coast Conference (“ACC”) to “adopt or amend [NCAA] legislation that is identified
as an area of autonomy.” See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.,
(granting autonomous authority to the five conferences). These areas of legislative
autonomy are intended “to permit the use of resources to advance the legitimate edu-
cations or athletics-related needs of student-athletes and for legislative changes that
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FBS institutions are public and private, non-sectarian and relig-
iously affiliated, large land grant universities with big budgets and
big endowments, and small liberal arts colleges. Some FBS institu-
tions offer extensive graduate and professional programs; others
concentrate exclusively on undergraduate education.12
As part of the August 2014 Division I Governance re-design, the
NCAA Division I Board of Directors, acting on the recommendation
of a Board-appointed Steering Committee, granted certain autono-
mous decision-making powers to the Autonomy 5 conferences and
their sixty-five member institutions.13 In effect, this recommendation
by the Board’s Steering Committee enabled the Autonomy 5 confer-
ences to begin to adopt policy legislation independently from the rest
of Division I. Accordingly, the Steering Committee developed and
recommended a structure “designed to allow permissive use of re-
sources or to otherwise enhance the well-being of student-athletes by
any [Autonomy 5 institutional] member, [or] to advance the legitimate
educational or athletics-related needs of student-athletes.”14 Specifi-
cally, the Board delegated authority to the Autonomy 5 conferences
to oversee policy development in the following areas: health and well-
ness, meals and nutrition, certain aspects of financial aid, expenses
and benefits pertaining both to student-athlete support, and to pre-
enrollment support, insurance and career transition, career pursuits,
time demands, academic support, recruiting, and personnel.15 Under
will otherwise enhance student-athlete well-being.” Id. § 5.3.2.1.2 (also specifying ar-
eas of autonomy).
12. Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, Two, Four, Six, Eight; What Can We Now Regulate?
The Regulatory Mentality and NCAA Satellite Camps (Et al), 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
287, 292 (2017) [hereinafter Two, Four, Six, Eight].
13. NCAA, DIVISION I STEERING COMMITTEE ON GOVERNANCE: RECOMMENDED
GOVERNANCE MODEL 29 (July 18, 2014) [hereinafter RECOMMENDED MODEL], http://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Steering%20Commitee%20on%20Gov%20
Proposed%20Model%2007%2018%2014%204.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NJC-ZE3V]. In
August 2013, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors began an initiative to redesign
the “governance structure for Division I. Board Chair Nathan Hatch appointed a
Steering Committee of the Board to guide this effort.” Id. at 10. The Steering Com-
mittee included Dr. Hatch and seven other University Presidents or Chancellors. Id.
at 2.
14. Id. at 29. In addition, under the new model, legislation adopted by the Auton-
omy conferences is permissive and “may also be applied by the rest of Division I at
each conference’s respective discretion, which may include delegation of such discre-
tion to its member institutions.” Id.
15. Id. at 29–32. In particular, the Board delegated authority to the Autonomy 5
conferences with regard to policy development pertaining to specific bylaws relating
to these areas. These include the following: health and wellness, NCAA MANUAL
2017–18, supra note 4, § 16.4; meals and nutrition, id. § 16.5; certain aspects of finan-
cial aid, id. §§ 15.01.5–15.2.8.2, 15.3–15.3.5.2; expenses and benefits pertaining to stu-
dent-athlete support, id. § 16; expenses and benefits relating to pre-enrollment
support, id. § 13.2; insurance and career transition, id. §§ 12.2–12.3; career pursuits, id.
§12.5; time demands, id. § 17; academic support, id. § 16.3; recruiting, id. § 13.1; and
personnel, id. § 11.7. See also id. § 5.3.2.1.2 (identifying and summarizing the eleven
general “areas of autonomy”).
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the revised structure, the Autonomy 5 conferences have the exclusive
autonomy to consider and adopt bylaw changes (i.e. NCAA legisla-
tion) in these designated areas.16 The remaining twenty-seven confer-
ences that comprise Division I continue to have legislative authority,
in conjunction with the Autonomy 5 conferences, to recommend
changes to other portions of the NCAA Manual, but only “for matters
other than autonomy legislation.”17
This Article will explore the development and certain key highlights
of the redesigned governance process for NCAA Division I and dis-
cuss some of the early successes achieved via the new structure. In
addition, the Article will also address certain challenges that remain in
play with the new structure, and will include a particular focus on one
specific area of concern—scholarship support in non-revenue sports.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW
GOVERNANCE MODEL
Trying to manage and regulate almost 350 colleges and universities
across the country that comprise Division I (“DI”), and which vary
widely in terms of size and resources, is quite challenging.18 The
NCAA has made several attempts over the years at reforming the
management of the organization. This Section will explore highlights
of the historical development of NCAA governance, followed by a
description of both the process leading to the current model that was
adopted in 2014 and key aspects of the current model’s structure.
A. Evolution of NCAA DI Governance
Historically, the NCAA has attempted many different approaches
to the governance of its member institutions. For example, in 1973 the
NCAA created its current “configuration of three divisions (DI, DII,
and DIII), roughly divided along the lines of institutional
demographics including mission, size, degrees offered, student profile,
endowment, and operating budget.”19 In 1979, the NCAA split the
16. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 7 (summarizing that the Auton-
omy 5 “conferences and their 65 member institutions [were] granted autonomy in
specific areas”).
17. Id. The Autonomy 5 conferences are also eligible to vote on shared govern-
ance issues, along with the other 27 conferences. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra
note 4, § 4.3.1 (a)–(c), (identifying the level of weighted voting for each of the 32
conferences for shared governance issues overseen by the DI Council).
18. Division I has 347 member institutions spread across thirty-two conferences.
Our Three Divisions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa
-101/our-three-divisions [https://perma.cc/97N8-82SA]; NCAA MANUAL 2017–18,
supra note 4, § 4.3.4 (listing the thirty-two conferences).
19. Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, Connie Dillon, & David Clough, What’s At Our
Core? NCAA Division I Voting Patterns vs. Student-Athlete Well-Being, Academic
Standards and the Amateur (Collegiate) Model, KNIGHT COMMISSION 1 (2012), http://
www.knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/2012research/2012kciareports_potuto_dillon
_clough_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6QR-8Y3X].
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football schools into Division I-A for larger, higher-resourced institu-
tions who played “major college football” and Division I-AA for
“schools that wanted to reduce resources or could not keep up finan-
cially.”20 Governance within the full division was still driven by a one-
school, one-vote process, however.21 That approach changed upon
adoption of NCAA legislation in 1996 that created a new voting struc-
ture,22 and beginning in 1997, DI “adopted bylaws through represen-
tative governance by conferences.”23
The last two decades saw several additional transitions. There was a
DI Management Council, which along with the DI Board of Directors,
adopted and amended bylaws from 1997-2008, and in August 2008 DI
transitioned legislative authority to a Legislative Council.24 In addi-
tion, in 2006 the NCAA re-named Divisions I-A and I-AA as the FBS
and FCS subdivisions of Division I.25 During the governance eras of
both the DI Management Council and the DI Legislative Council, the
NCAA employed weighted voting, and the FBS conferences collec-
tively had “more votes than the combined votes” of the  FCS and non-
football conferences.26 The use of weighted voting gave more power
to the Division I-A/FBS conferences.27
The Legislative Council process remained in force from 2008 until
the August 2014 DI governance overhaul.28 Under that process, each
of the thirty-two DI conferences had a representative member on the
Legislative Council.29 There was also weighted voting.30 Nonetheless,
even with weighted voting, there were concerns about the structure,
20. Anthony G. Weaver, New Policies, New Structure, New Problems? Reviewing
the NCAA’s Autonomy Model, 7 ELON L. REV. 551, 556 (2015). Interestingly, one of
the media reports at the time suggested that the larger schools had taken “a cautious
step toward autonomy.” John Underwood, The NCAA Splits Its Decision, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 23, 1978), https://www.si.com/vault/1978/01/23/106772446/the-
ncaa-splits-its-decision [https://perma.cc/X5N9-BKPQ].
21. Weaver, supra note 20, at 556.
22. Id. at 557.
23. Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 2. Beginning in 1997, DI bylaws
were “administered and enforced uniformly throughout DI” except for football-spe-
cific legislation that can vary between FBS and FCS institutions. See id. at 2, 2 n.18
(describing football exception).
24. Id. at 7.
25. Jon Johnston, NCAA College Football Classifications – FBS, FCS, Div IA, Div
IAA – Still Confusing?, CORNNATION (June 1, 2009), https://www.cornnation.com/
2009/6/1/894907/ncaa-college-football [https://perma.cc/RJ9A-NEAY].
26. See Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 7 (detailing the weighted vot-
ing history).
27. Weaver, supra note 20, at 557.
28. See Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 7 (describing the transition of
the Management Council’s legislative function to the Legislative Council in August
2008). In addition to the Legislative Council, other governance functions resided with
the Leadership Council. See NCAA CONSTITUTION §§ 4.5.1, 4.6.1, NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL 2014–15 (Aug. 2014) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL 2014–15], http://
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D115.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL6W-
SATW].
29. Id. § 4.6.1.
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particularly from FBS and Autonomy 5 institutions.31 In addition, re-
search revealed that under the Legislative Council structure “the price
tag associated with a legislative proposal . . . [was] statistically signifi-
cant as to whether it . . . [was] adopted or defeated, . . . [was] signifi-
cant to voting by DI subdivisions, and . . . [was] significant even when
a proposal ha[d] negative impact on student-athlete well-being or aca-
demic standards.”32 Indeed, the Autonomy 5 conferences and member
institutions began seeking greater “autonomy after a 2011 proposal to
add a $2,000 stipend to the value of a scholarship to help cover the
cost of attendance for athletes was voted down by NCAA schools that
were concerned about affording a stipend.”33
B. Steps to Developing a New Model
In January 2013, the DI Board of Directors engaged an outside con-
sultant, Jean Frankel of Ideas for Action, LLC, “to gather input from
the Division I membership and other key stakeholders about the state
of Division I governance.”34 Ms. Frankel later described the 2013 situ-
ation she encountered at NCAA as follows:
The need for change was apparent. The NCAA was facing an urgent
problem at its highest level—Division I—which had one member-
ship, governance, and legislative rule-making system trying to ac-
commodate all the different perspectives of its diverse member
schools. Tensions ran high enough that the largest schools began to
consider the possibility of breaking away to form their own organi-
zation. At the same time, the NCAA was dealing with outside pres-
30. Representatives of seven conferences had three votes each, representatives of
four conferences had 1.5 votes each, and the remaining twenty-one conferences had
1.14 votes each. Id. § 4.6.1 (a)–(c).
31. See, e.g., 1A FAR BOARD, PRINCIPLES AND MODEL FOR NEW GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE 5, https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/1A%20
FAR%20Board%20Principles%20and%20Model%20for%20New%20NCAA%20
Governance%20Structure.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N9X-PZQL] (recommending a gov-
erning council that combined the functions of the then-existing Leadership and Legis-
lative Councils and suggesting that the division between the two councils had not
worked particularly well).
32. See Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 3 (also noting that “price tag
matters without regard to whether a proposal has positive, negative, or neutral impact
on student-athlete welfare or academic standards”). Id. at 3 n.22.
33. Ron Clements & Joe Rodgers, Power 5 NCAA Schools Pass New Scholarship,
Concussion Proposals, SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.sportingnews.com/
ncaa-football/news/power-5-ncaa-schools-vote-new-scholarship-concussion-proposals-
autonomy/mdv2pvwbc6py1e6v16tsa0ew8 [https://perma.cc/K57X-2MTG]; Weaver,
supra note 20, at 558 (asserting that the “push for this round of autonomy started
after a 2011 proposal to provide stipends to student-athletes was rejected”).
34. Michelle B. Hosick, Division I Structure and Process Review Continues,
NCAA (July 30, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/divi
sion-i-structure-and-process-review-continues-0 [https://perma.cc/J4LE-UDYD]. Ms.
Frankel held initial meetings with many NCAA constituency groups in January and
February of 2013, and then sent an online survey to schools and conferences in April
2013. Id.
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sures, such as schools switching conferences to chase money,
lawsuits over students’ likenesses being used in video games, and
the ongoing debates over concussion protocols and whether stu-
dent-athletes should be paid.35
After receiving input from Ms. Frankel at its August 2013 meeting, the
DI Board determined that the January 2014 NCAA Convention
would include a two-day session to “engage the full range of Division
I stakeholders in open and collaborative conversations about [the] Di-
vision I governance structure and processes . . . .”36 In addition, later
in 2013 and prior to the January 2014 convention, the DI Board of
Directors invited representatives from nine different groups of DI
stakeholders to provide their respective visions for the division.37
The DI Board’s Steering Committee presided at the ensuing two-
day discussion session with convention delegates, entitled “Division I
Governance Dialogue,” at the 2014 NCAA Convention in San Diego
35. Jean S. Frankel & Nancy Alexander, Pumped-Up Governance: Lessons From
the NCAA’s Restructuring, ASSOCIATIONS NOW (Feb. 1, 2015), http://associationsnow.
com/2015/02/pumped-up-governance-lessons-from-the-ncaas-restructuring/ [https://
perma.cc/95TR-Y2HX]. Ms. Frankel added that during “the first six months of 2013,
we listened to more than 200 stakeholders—university presidents, athletics directors,
faculty, student-athletes, and conference commissioners and staff.” Id. In addition,
although she found a broad lack of satisfaction with the then-existing governance
structure, there was a surprising “level of agreement about basic issues . . . and a sense
of urgency to finally tackle the big issues that would lead to fundamental change.” Id.
36. See Michelle B. Hosick, Division I Board Asks Membership to Help Streamline
Structure, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/division-i-board-asks-membership-help-streamline-structure-1 [https://perma.cc/
HC4R-YJXV] (indicating that the DI Board wanted the membership to help them
design “a more transparent, responsive, participative and streamlined governance
structure”).
37. Michelle B. Hosick, Groups to Discuss Governance Ideas with DI Board,
NCAA (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
groups-discuss-governance-ideas-di-board [https://perma.cc/EB35-J3Y5]. The invitees
included representative leaders from coaches’ associations, the Collegiate Commis-
sioners Association, athletics directors’ groups, faculty groups, the Knight Commis-
sion, the National Association for Athletics Compliance, the Student-Athlete
Advisory Committee, women’s administrators, and ethnic minority administrators
and faculty. Id. The sessions took place on October 29, 2013, at the NCAA headquar-
ters in Indianapolis. Id. The Author of this Article made a presentation on behalf of
the 1A FAR Association. Id. In addition, prior to this October 2013 meeting, 1A FAR
urged that “both FARs and senior athletic administrators need to be fully involved in
the development of proposals regarding the form that a new Division I governance
structure might ultimately take.” Letter from Brian D. Shannon, President, 1A FAR
Board, to Nathan O. Hatch, Chair, NCAA Division I Board of Directors (Aug. 8,
2013), http://www.oneafar.org/archive/2013_archive/Letter_from_Shannon_to_
Hatch.pdf [https://perma.cc/27A6-QZY8]. Moreover, in September 2013, 1A FAR
had submitted a detailed proposal recommending that the FBS conferences and mem-
ber schools split off from the rest of Division I and become a new, separate division
within the NCAA. See Letter from Brian D. Shannon, President, 1A FAR Board, to
Nathan O. Hatch, Chair, NCAA Division I Board of Directors (Sept. 11, 2013) http://
www.oneafar.org/archive/2013_archive/Governance_Proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UD6H-J25F] (forwarding the 1A FAR’s proposed Principles and Model for a New
Governance Structure; see infra notes 135–38 & accompanying text).
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in January 2014.38 In advance of the discussion forum, the Steering
Committee released a draft governance model in order to seek feed-
back and generate dialogue at the convention sessions.39 The draft
model included “several areas of possible autonomy for the five larg-
est conferences, designed to allow schools in those conferences to use
additional resources to benefit student-athletes.”40
At the January 2014 discussion forum, there was significant senti-
ment expressed that the new governance structure should seek repre-
sentation from all the different groups involved in college athletics,
including greater roles for student-athletes and athletics directors.41
The chair of the Student-Athlete Advisory Committee asked that the
Steering Committee “not forget to include student-athlete voices
throughout the structure.”42 Moreover, and of particular significance,
38. See Michelle B. Hosick, Division I Members to Consider Structural Changes at
Convention, NCAA (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-cen
ter/news/division-i-members-consider-structural-changes-convention [https://perma.
cc/BCD4-4RJ7] (indicating that the discussion forum was part of the broader govern-
ance review process).
39. See id. (predicting that the two-day session would “help refine the model and
identify areas of agreement—and disagreement—through polling of attendees”).
40. Id. The Steering Committee identified possible areas of autonomy including
“the definition of a full scholarship, health and safety of student-athletes and agents
and advisors.” Id.
41. See Michelle B. Hosick, Members Want Diverse Voices in DI Governance,
NCAA (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/mem
bers-want-diverse-voices-di-governance [https://perma.cc/76B6-A7CC] (describing
the desire to include student-athletes at all levels in the new structure and
“[p]roviding a greater role for athletics directors”). Some were less sanguine about
the tenor of the discussions. See, e.g., Pete Volk, The NCAA Is Falling Apart: Athletic
Directors Growing Frustrated, SBNATION (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.sbnation.com/
college-football/2014/1/17/5318524/ncaa-governance-dialogue-meeting [https://perma.
cc/KFV7-5SMM] (reporting that during the two-day session “university athletic direc-
tors repeatedly expressed disapproval with the NCAA’s idea of change”); Allie Gras-
green, What About the Athletes?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 17, 2014), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/01/17/division-i-questions-how-athletes-fit-new-
governance-structure [https://perma.cc/2YVW-HVQV] (discussing the Steering Com-
mittee’s not having previously contemplated inclusion of student-athletes in the re-
vamped structure). The Author was present and participated in the two-day
discussion forum. There were over 800 athletics directors, FARs, and university presi-
dents in attendance. Id. Even members of the DI Board of Directors “noted some
cynicism . . . among participants, but remained optimistic that they . . . [could] find a
positive solution to the governance issues.” Michelle B. Hosick, Board Assesses Dia-
logue, Looks at Next Steps for Restructuring, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.ncaa.
org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-assesses-dialogue-looks-next-steps-re
structuring [https://perma.cc/FFQ3-H9RZ].
42. See Michelle B. Hosick, DI Members Provide Feedback on Restructuring Ideas,
NCAA (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-
members-provide-feedback-restructuring-ideas [https://perma.cc/2FUF-97ZQ] (quot-
ing Maddie Salamone, who had been a lacrosse student-athlete at Duke). Ms.
Salamone added, “My challenge to this committee is that the proof is in the pudding,
and we are all hungry for some meaningful change. Part of that change must be to
include student-athletes at the highest level of governance because we are the ones
who are affected by the rules 365 days a year, 24 hours a day.” Id.
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a strong majority of the attendees expressed support for granting au-
tonomy to the Autonomy 5 conferences in certain areas of
governance.43
The DI Board’s Steering Committee continued to gather input and
work on a draft governance model throughout the winter and spring
of 2014.44 Then, in late April 2014, the Board endorsed a model for
governance re-design and directed that the model be submitted to the
DI membership for comment and feedback prior to the August 2014
DI Board meeting.45 The restructured process was intended to allow
“the division to be more nimble, streamlined and responsive to needs
– particularly the needs of student-athletes.”46 As then drafted, the
governance model set forth the expectation that the DI Board would
be less operational and, instead, “focus chiefly on oversight and strate-
gic issues, while leaving much of the day-to-day policy and legislative
responsibility to the council.”47 In turn, the new governing Council
was intended to “be the final voice on shared-governance rule-making
decisions” and be “composed of at least 60 percent athletics direc-
43. See George Schroeder, Analysis: At NCAA Convention, Div. I Path Becomes
Clearer, USA TODAY SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/2014/01/17/ncaa-convention-division-i-governance-debate-autonomy/4594249/
[perma.cc/V25L-VEVY] (discussing the results of non-binding polling of the 800 dele-
gates on the following question: “To what extent does the room support the concept
of autonomy for the big five conferences in certain still-to-be-defined areas?”).
44. See Michelle B. Hosick, Steering Committee Working Toward New Govern-
ance Model, NCAA (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-cen
ter/steering-committee-working-toward-new-governance-model [https://perma.cc/7
ZH6-GDXB] (discussing the state of the drafting effort as of March 2014 and indicat-
ing that a set of five conferences would have autonomy in specific areas); Student-
athlete, AD, Faculty Rep Would Have Votes on Proposed New Board, NCAA (Mar.
25, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/student-athlete-ad-
faculty-rep-would-have-votes-proposed-new-board [https://perma.cc/5HB4-BS2N]
(indicating that the Steering Committee wanted to reconstitute the board of directors
to include not only university presidents, but also one student-athlete, a FAR, and an
athletics director, who would also serve as chair of a new governance group called the
Council that would report to the DI Board); Michelle B. Hosick, DI Board Endorses
Restructuring, Seeks Feedback from Schools, NCAA (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.ncaa.
org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-board-endorses-restructuring-seeks-feed
back-schools [https://perma.cc/J47Z-RD8Z] (summarizing the DI Board’s endorse-
ment of the Steering Committee’s draft governance model, and also noting that the
Board would be seeking membership comment on the draft proposal).
45. Michelle B. Hosick, DI Board Endorses Restructuring, Seeks Feedback from
Schools, NCAA (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/di-board-endorses-restructuring-seeks-feedback-schools [https://perma.cc/J47Z-
RD8Z]. For a collection of subsequently submitted comments from constituent mem-
bers and organizations from across NCAA Division I, see http://www.ncaa.org/sites/
default/files/Feedback%20from%20membership%20since%205%2014%20%282%
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Z4-C28Y].
46. Michelle B. Hosick, DI Board Endorses Restructuring, Seeks Feedback from
Schools, NCAA (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/di-board-endorses-restructuring-seeks-feedback-schools [https://perma.cc/
EAN9-CBD4].
47. Id.
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tors.”48 The model also included language to grant autonomy to the
Autonomy 5 conferences “to address their unique challenges [and] . . .
make rules on specific matters affecting the interests of student-
athletes.”49
C. The New Governance Structure—Highlights
On August 7, 2014, the DI Board adopted an amended version of
the previous drafts and significantly restructured the governance sys-
tem for DI conferences and institutions.50 Most notably, the revised
structure provides autonomy to the Autonomy 5 “conferences to
change rules for themselves in a list of specific areas within Division
I.”51 In practical effect, the NCAA granted authority to the Autonomy
5 conferences to act independently from the rest of Division I in cer-
tain areas.52
In addition to granting greater authority to the Autonomy 5 confer-
ences and institutions, there were three additional highlights included
in the revised structure. First, the restructuring expanded the DI
Board to twenty-four members and, as revised, includes not only uni-
versity presidents, but also a student-athlete, an athletics director, a
FAR, and a senior woman athletics representative.53 In addition, the
governance redesign emphasized that the Board should focus “on
oversight, policy and strategic issues” given that prior to the changes,
the “Board focused too often on legislative matters.”54 Second, for
48. Id.
49. Id. The areas of autonomy identified at that time included “cost of attendance
and scholarship guarantees, insurance, [ ] academic support, [ ] and other [forms of]
support, [including] travel for families and [even parking costs].” Id.
50. See Michelle B. Hosick, Board Adopts New Division I Structure, NCAA (Aug.
7, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-new-
division-i-structure [https://perma.cc/Z6XH-YBCK] (discussing 16-2 vote in favor of
adopting new governance model).
51. Id. One commentator observed that the DI Board had “voted through a
new—and potentially groundbreaking—measure . . . when it approved the ‘Big Five’
athletic conferences’ ability to govern themselves and push through rules changes as
they see fit.” Kent Babb, NCAA Board of Directors Approves Autonomy for “Big
Five” Conference Schools, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5-confer
ence-schools/2014/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html?utm_
term=.49684ce39cf3 [https://perma.cc/E322-MHFQ].
52. See id. (observing that the DI Board’s restructuring had put “an effective end
to the suggestion that all 351 Division I programs operate on a level playing field”);
Mark Tracy, N.C.A.A. Votes to Give Richest Conferences More Autonomy, NEW
YORK TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/sports/ncaafootball/
ncaa-votes-to-give-greater-autonomy-to-richest-conferences.html?_r=1 [https://
perma.cc/TX6M-8VUB] (describing the DI Board’s action as the “first step toward an
aristocracy in college sports” and that the “result of the vote seemed to acknowledge
that even within the nearly 350 institutions in the N.C.A.A.’s top division, universities
and conferences are in markedly different situations”).
53. Hosick, supra note 50.
54. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 7 (comparing key shifts from
the former governance model to the new model).
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NCAA legislation and policy-development across DI in areas not
ceded to the Autonomy 5 conferences, the new governance structure
created a forty-member Council. The Council must include represent-
atives from each of the thirty-two conferences, a minimum of 60%
athletics directors, conference commissioners, FARs, senior woman
administrators, and student-athletes.55 The new DI Council replaced
the former Leadership and the Legislative Council and was created to
“make the day-to-day policy and legislative decisions for Division I.”56
There was also a conscious effort to assure that practitioners were
“represented and empowered within the governance system.”57 Fi-
nally,  the model created a new Committee on Academics to “manage
all policy and regulation pertaining to academic matters.”58 Prior to
the governance re-design, authority for academic policy development
was split between an Academic Cabinet, a Committee on Academic
Performance, and the DI Board.59 It made great sense to collapse
these functions into a single committee to improve the former “awk-
ward governance structure related to consideration of academic
matters.”60
The redesigned structure also includes differing mechanisms and
processes for adopting DI policy changes depending on whether the
issue falls under the purview of the Autonomy 5 conferences or is a
matter of shared governance to be considered by the Council. First,
with regard to autonomy matters, under the new governance structure
the member institutions from the Autonomy 5 conferences have ex-
clusive authority to adopt and revise policies in certain delineated por-
tions of the NCAA Manual.61 A representative from each of the sixty-
five member institutions in the Autonomy 5 conferences and three
student-athletes from each of the five conferences are eligible to vote
55. See id. at 21 (identifying the breakdown of groups to be represented on the
Council and also recommending that an athletics director serve as the chair).
56. Hosick, supra note 50.
57. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 7–8 (also finding that practi-
tioners were not fully represented or involved in the former governance structure).
Professor Potuto has pointed out, however, that the NCAA DI Manual does not in-
clude a definition of the term “practitioner.” See Potuto, Two, Four, Six, Eight, supra
note 12, at 292 n.33 (adding that “[i]n theory, practitioners are both athletic adminis-
trators and faculty athletic representatives”). As part of the DI Board’s rationale
statement for the governance redesign, although not defining “practitioner” per se,
the Board stated, “Primary legislative responsibility will include directors of athletics,
faculty athletics representatives and other practitioners, including student-athletes.”
RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 8 (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 25–26 (also granting authority to the Committee on Academics “to
approve routine, noncontroversial academic policy”).
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id. at 26.
61. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 5.02.1 (granting legislative flexi-
bility and autonomy to the Autonomy 5 conferences in certain areas of autonomy “to
permit the use of resources to advance the legitimate educational or athletics-related
needs of student-athletes and for legislative changes that will otherwise enhance stu-
dent-athlete well-being”).
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on Autonomy legislation.62 Accordingly, at each autonomy business
session, there are a total of eighty eligible voters.63 In turn, approval
of autonomy legislation requires the following vote totals:
(a) Approval of three of the five conferences based on a simple ma-
jority vote of the institutions within each conference and a 60 per-
cent majority vote of the eligible institutions and student-athlete
representatives; or
(b) Approval of four of the five conferences based on a simple ma-
jority vote of the institutions within each conference and a simple
majority vote of the eligible [sic] institutions and student-athlete
representatives.64
By way of contrast, for shared governance (non-autonomy) issues and
bylaws, the DI Board vested the Council with primary legislative au-
thority.65 Among the forty representatives on the Council, there is
also weighted voting.66 For non-football issues, the representatives
from Autonomy 5 conferences have four votes each, the representa-
tives from the remaining five FBS conferences have two votes each,
and the representatives from the remaining twenty-two DI confer-
ences have one vote each.67 In addition, the two student-athlete repre-
sentatives and the two FARs (representing the 1A Faculty Athletics
Representatives and the Faculty Athletics Representatives Associa-
tion, respectively) have one vote each.68 For FBS football issues, only
the individuals representing the ten FBS conferences may vote. Rep-
resentatives from the Autonomy 5 conferences have two votes each,
and members from the other five FBS conferences have one vote
62. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 6–7 (permitting “the five con-
ferences and their 65 member institutions and 15 student-athlete representatives (80
total) to act on legislation” in the areas of autonomy); NCAA MANUAL 2017–18,
supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.7.1 (requiring that the “president or chancellor of each institu-
tion shall appoint one representative and each of the five conferences shall appoint
three student-athlete representatives to cast votes on” autonomy measures). The Au-
thor of this Article has served as the duly appointed voting representative for Texas
Tech University at past Autonomy 5 business sessions.
63. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 6–7 (describing that with each
of the sixty-five schools having one vote, along with fifteen student-athlete represent-
atives, it results in a total of eighty votes).
64. NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.7.2. Accordingly, there must
be an affirmative vote by a majority of the institutions in at least three of the Auton-
omy 5 conferences and forty-eight or more of the eighty eligible voters (schools plus
student-athletes), or an affirmative vote by a majority of the institutions in at least
four of the Autonomy 5 conferences and forty-one or more of the eighty eligible
voters.
65. NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, §§ 4.3.1, 4.3.2(a).
66. Id. § 4.3.4.
67. Id. § 4.3.4 (a)–(c).
68. Id. § 4.3.4 (d)–(e).
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each.69 Similarly, only the eleven representatives from the FCS con-
ferences may vote on FCS football issues.70
III. THE NEW GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE—THE FIRST
THREE YEARS
Implementation of the revised governance structure that the DI
Board approved in August 2014 commenced in January 2015.71 At the
January 2015 NCAA Convention, the Autonomy 5 conferences con-
ducted their first business session.72 In addition, the new forty-mem-
ber DI Council met for the first time.73 At that meeting, the full
Council appointed an interim administrative committee to draft an
outline of supporting-governance substructure bodies, and tasked the
temporary committee with formulating a plan and recommendations
prior to the February 2015 Council meeting.74 Finally, at the end of
the NCAA’s January 2015 convention week, the new DI Board of Di-
69. Id. § 4.3.4.1 (a)–(b). That is, only ten of the thirty-two members of the Council
may vote on FBS football issues. For example, the Author came from an FBS Confer-
ence (the Big 12), but his seat on the Council is as the 1A FAR Association represen-
tative—not as the Big 12 representative. Accordingly, the Author does not have a
vote on football issues.
70. Id. § 4.3.5. For a further description of the DI Council legislative process, see
Potuto, Two, Four, Six, Eight, supra note 12, at 293–94.
71. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 42–44 (discussing the transition
from the former governance structure and the implementation schedule for the new
governance system). In the meantime, although the August 2014 DI Board approval
was subject to a possible override under the former bylaws, as of early October 2014
the override period expired with only twenty-seven schools having “requested an
override of the legislation that finalized the restructuring plan, less than the 75 re-
quired.” Michelle B. Hosick, Restructuring Moves Forward, NCAA (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/restructuring-moves-forward
[https://perma.cc/ZZ8Q-23PD].
72. The first Autonomy 5 business meeting under the new structure took place on
January 17, 2015. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarships in His-
toric Vote, USA TODAY SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-cost-of-attendance-student-athletes-schol-
arships/21921073/ [https://perma.cc/2VLG-YHSB]. The Author was a participant at
the January 2015 Autonomy 5 session, both as the voting representative for Texas
Tech University and as the Parliamentarian for the proceedings.
73. See Michelle B. Hosick, New Division I Council Convenes for First Time,
NCAA (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-
division-i-council-convenes-first-time [https://perma.cc/LA93-WA7F] (describing the
first Council meeting). As one of the appointees to the Council, the Author was also
in attendance at this meeting.
74. See id. (describing the appointment of the temporary committee and listing its
members, including the Author). At that ensuing February 2015 meeting, the Council
adopted and forwarded to the DI Board of Directors a governance substructure that
included seven key committees and an administrative coordination committee that
would report to the full Council. Report of the NCAA Division I Council Meeting,
NCAA, 1–3 (Feb. 3–4, 2015), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Coun
cil%20Report%20February%202015%20Final_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GB4-
QFBG]. The adopted substructure included a Legislative Committee, the Student-
Athlete Experience Committee, a Strategic Vision and Planning Committee, the
Council Coordination Committee, the Competition Oversight Committee, and three
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rectors met for the first time and “began conversations about how it
should operate moving forward, with an eye toward becoming a body
more focused on the overall strategy of Division I.”75
The revised governance structure facilitated several key successes,
notably Autonomy 5 legislation to enhance athletics scholarships and
to respond to concerns about the time demands expected of student-
athletes.76 The new governance structure has also been blessed with
talented leaders. Despite these successes, there have been several
challenges, with more potential challenges on the horizon. This Sec-
tion will address selected successes and challenges.
A. Successes
1. Cost of Attendance Scholarships
As described above, following the NCAA Division I Board’s Au-
gust 2014 adoption of the new governance model, the first business
session for the Autonomy 5 conferences took place at the NCAA con-
vention in Washington, D.C. in January 2015.77 Chief among the mea-
sures considered and adopted at the meeting was legislation
authorizing athletic scholarship limits to be expanded to cover the full
cost of attendance at each institution.78 The Autonomy 5 voted over-
whelmingly to authorize cost of attendance scholarships by a 79-1
sport-specific oversight committees for football, men’s basketball, and women’s bas-
ketball. Id. attachment A, at 7.
75. Michelle B. Hosick, New Board Starts Discussions on Future of Division I,
NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-
board-starts-discussions-future-division-i [https://perma.cc/42ET-B6YE] (discussing
an identified need for establishing a decision-making “process that would be based on
the core values of the division, such as integrating academics and athletics and priori-
tizing student-athlete well-being”).
76. See infra notes 77–127 & accompanying text.
77. The first Autonomy 5 business meeting under the new structure was held on
January 17, 2015. See Berkowitz, supra note 72.
78. See Michelle B. Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholar-
ships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/au
tonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships [https://perma.cc/P67Y-7U29]
(discussing the adoption of full cost of attendance scholarships). Even when the new
governance model was adopted in August 2014, there was anticipation that the Au-
tonomy 5 would pursue raising scholarship limits to full cost of attendance. See Kent
Babb, NCAA Board of Directors Approves Autonomy for ‘Big Five’ Conference
Schools, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5-conference-schools/20
14/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html?utm_term=.E3454eaa93
07 [https://perma.cc/2BAC-S9D4] (anticipating that “[o]ne of the first topics expected
to be addressed in the coming months is whether amateur athletes in the NCAA’s
highest-revenue sports, namely football and men’s basketball, are entitled to addi-
tional benefits, including a stipend”).
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vote.79 At the same meeting, the Autonomy 5 conferences also voted
that athletic scholarships could not be revoked for athletic reasons.80
What does it mean that athletic scholarship limits were increased to
permit grants for the full cost of attendance? Prior to the January 2015
adoption of the cost of attendance legislation, the NCAA bylaws lim-
ited scholarships to tuition, fees, room, board, and books.81 Although
generous, these scholarships did not cover the full cost of attending a
university and excluded “the incidental costs of attending college . . .
[such as] transportation and miscellaneous personal expenses.”82 Af-
ter the 2015 amendments, however, the relevant bylaw defining a “full
grant-in-aid” athletics scholarship changed to “financial aid that con-
sists of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses
related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of attendance” as
calculated for that institution.83 As the NCAA explained: “[t]he addi-
tional funds are intended to cover the real costs of attending college
not covered by the previous definition of a full scholarship.”84 Specifi-
cally, the NCAA bylaws define “cost of attendance” by reference to
federal financial aid rules and provide that: “[t]he ‘cost of attendance’
is an amount calculated by an institutional financial aid office, using
federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees,
79. See Berkowitz, supra note 72 (describing the “landmark action for major-col-
lege sports, schools and athlete representatives from the NCAA’s five wealthiest con-
ferences . . . voted 79-1 to expand what Division I schools can provide under an
athletic scholarship”). The one dissenting vote came from Boston College. Id.
80. See Hosick, supra note 78 (discussing actions by the Autonomy 5 conferences
at the January 2015 business meeting).
81. Specifically, the former version of the bylaws defined a “full grant-in-aid”
scholarship as “financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and board, and
required course-related books.” NCAA MANUAL 2014–15, supra note 28, § 15.02.5.
82. See Berkowitz, supra note 72 (reporting about the NCAA’s redefinition of a
full athletic scholarship). As part of the United States Department of Education’s
online materials for completing the Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA), cost of attendance is explained as follows:
The cost of attendance (COA) is not the bill that you may get from your
college; it is the total amount it will cost you to go to college each year. The
COA includes tuition and fees; on-campus room and board (or a housing
and food allowance for off-campus students); and allowances for books, sup-
plies, transportation, loan fees, and, if applicable, dependent care. It can also
include other expenses like an allowance for the rental or purchase of a per-
sonal computer, costs related to a disability, or costs for eligible study-
abroad programs.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Cost of Attendance, FAFSA, https://fafsa.ed.gov/help/costatt.htm
[https://perma.cc/GD5P-U4G7] (last visited July 28, 2017). Interestingly, from 1956
until 1975, the NCAA’s amateurism rules permitted a full scholarship to include not
only tuition, fees, room, board, and books, but also “cash for incidental expenses such
as laundry.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
83. NCAA MANUAL 2017–2018, supra note 4, § 15.02.5 (emphasis added).
84. Cost of Attendance Q&A, NCAA (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncaa.com/news/
ncaa/article/2015-09-03/cost-attendance-qa [https://perma.cc/T76N-ZGRP].
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room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other ex-
penses related to attendance at the institution.”85
Just as tuition and fees vary by institution, there will be differences
in the cost of attendance among the institutions that elect to award
full cost of attendance scholarships.86 There can also be variances
among individual student-athletes depending on the institution’s poli-
cies on applying federal financial aid guidelines.87 Some institutions
are located in places that have a higher cost of living, and other
schools are more geographically remote causing the average student
to have higher transportation costs than students at other universities.
The NCAA previously indicated that “there is an average difference
of about $2,500 between the value of . . . [the formerly allowable full
scholarship] and the value of an athletic scholarship based on cost of
attendance.”88
Without the change in governance structure to allow the Autonomy
5 conferences the authority to vote separately and independently from
the rest of Division I on certain autonomy subjects, it is likely that the
cost of attendance measure would not have been adopted in January
2015. For example, in October 2011 the DI Board adopted legislation
that would have provided authority to award $2,000 above the former
scholarship limits to student-athletes as payment toward covering the
85. NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 15.02.2. In addition, a university
cannot “award financial aid to a student-athlete that exceeds the cost of attendance
that normally is incurred by students enrolled in a comparable program at that institu-
tion.” Id. § 15.01.6.
86. See Cost of Attendance Q&A, NCAA (Sept. 3, 2015) http://www.ncaa.com/
news/ncaa/article/2015-09-03/cost-attendance-qa [https://perma.cc/T76N-ZGRP] (re-
sponding “no” to a question regarding whether “all college athletes receive the same
amount of money” and indicating that “[s]ubject to federal guidelines, financial aid
officers at each school determine the cost of attendance”).
87. See id. (adding that “based on each school’s policies, a student’s cost of attend-
ance can be adjusted based on his or her individual circumstances such as transporta-
tion, childcare needs and unusual medical expenses”). Universities can also have
differing costs of attendance for factors such as whether the student lives on or off
campus or is required to pay in-state versus out-of-state tuition. See Jon Solomon,
2015–16 CBS Sports FBS College Football Cost of Attendance Database, CBSS-
PORTS.COM (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/2015-16-
cbs-sports-fbs-college-football-cost-of-attendance-database/ [https://perma.cc/JZY5-
BZAL] (also setting forth tables showing the increase in costs of scholarships at many
FBS institutions after the implementation of the cost of attendance legislation). For
the eighty-two institutions (out of 129 FBS member schools) that replied to the sur-
vey, the figures ranged from less than $1,000 in increased scholarship funds per stu-
dent-athlete for some schools and greater than $6,000 at others. Jon Solomon, Cost of
Attendance Results: The Chase to Pay College Players, CBSSPORTS.COM (Aug. 20,
2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/cost-of-attendance-results-
the-chase-to-pay-college-players/ [https://perma.cc/SD47-NQBJ].
88. See Berkowitz, supra note 72 (discussing the Autonomy 5 vote to permit cost
of attendance scholarships).
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full cost of attendance.89 Notwithstanding the Board’s adoption of the
legislation, however, by mid-December 2011 more than 125 institu-
tions within Division I voted to override the provision, and the mea-
sure was suspended.90 The number of DI schools in favor of an
override later grew to 160, almost half of the DI membership.91 As
one commentator later reflected: “The proposal pitted big schools that
could afford the extra money against smaller schools that couldn’t,
and there were enough of the latter to table the measure.”92 Indeed,
only two of the sixty-five Autonomy 5 institutions were among the
large number of DI schools that voted to override.93 The Autonomy 5
conferences and member schools needed greater and independent au-
thority to adopt comparable legislation.94
Accordingly, the January 2015 adoption of NCAA legislation au-
thorizing full cost of attendance scholarships would not have been
possible without the 2014 Division I governance redesign. In addition
to changes in governance, however, then-pending federal litigation
provided significant impetus for adopting the measure. In August
2014, United States District Judge Claudia Wilken held in O’Bannon
89. NCAA Shelves $2,000 Athlete Stipend, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7357868/ncaa-puts-2000-stipend-ath
letes-hold [https://perma.cc/JN7A-A59F].
90. Id. Then, by late December 2011, “160 schools had signed onto override [the]
legislation” and the DI Board halted any further implementation. Michael Marot,
NCAA Asks for New Proposal on $2,000 Stipend, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 15, 2012),
http://lubbockonline.com/sports/2012-01-15/ncaa-asks-new-proposal-2000-stipend [ht
tps://perma.cc/3HSE-QEEY].
91. Id.
92. Tom Goldman, NCAA Vote Could Boost Student-Athletes’ Benefits, Big
Schools’ Power, NPR MORNING EDITION (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/
07/338498091/ncaa-vote-could-give-student-athletes-enhanced-benefits [https://
perma.cc/65AB-LZMU]. See also Andy Staples, Schools, Not NCAA, Standing in the
Way of Positive Scholarship Change, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 20, 2011), https://
www.si.com/more-sports/2011/12/20/ncaa-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/AT8A-
N43T] (analyzing override vote on the 2011 stipend legislation and concluding that it
was reflective of a divide between the DI “haves” and “have-nots” in terms of availa-
ble resources).
93. See Connor J. Bush, The Legal Shift of the NCAA’s “Big 5” Member Confer-
ences to Independent Athletic Associations: Combining NFL and Conference Govern-
ance Principles to Maintain the Unique Product of College Athletics, 16 DENVER
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 17–18 (2014), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/sports-and-en-
tertainment-law-journal/issues/16/Volume-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WK3-B93M]
(also observing that approving the $2,000 measure “would further separate the haves
from the have-nots”). For additional discussion of the $2,000 proposal, see Timothy
Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, NCAA Deregulation and Reform A Radical Shift of
Governance Philosophy?, 92 OREGON L. REV. 77, 110–12 (2013) (assessing the pas-
sage and eventual override of the measure).
94. Given the cost factor, it is not particularly surprising that a large number of DI
schools voted to override the $2,000 stipend legislation. Indeed, research has revealed
that there has been a direct correlation between a proposal’s price tag and its likeli-
hood of adoption. See Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 3 (summarizing
findings of research and correlation between price associated with NCAA legislative
proposals and adoption or defeat).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL103.txt unknown Seq: 18 22-DEC-17 12:04
82 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
v. NCAA that the NCAA’s rules that prohibited “student-athletes
from receiving any compensation for the use of their names, images,
and likenesses” beyond the then-existing scholarship limitations vio-
lated federal antitrust law.95 In O’Bannon, the plaintiffs were then-
current and former student-athletes in the sports of football and men’s
basketball who asserted that NCAA bylaws barring “student-athletes
from receiving a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its member
schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game telecasts, and
other footage . . . violate[d] the Sherman Antitrust Act.”96 After rul-
ing in favor of the plaintiffs, Judge Wilken issued an injunction that
precluded the NCAA from enforcing bylaws concerning football and
men’s basketball student-athletes that set a cap on “compensation” to
the student-athletes below a full cost of attendance scholarship.97
Judge Wilken also ruled that in connection with any licensing revenue
received by member institutions, the NCAA could not set rules that
would bar members from providing up to $5,000 (in 2014 dollars) per
student-athlete per year in the sports of football and men’s basketball
in trust for each year “that the student-athlete remains academically
eligible to compete.”98
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by not previ-
95. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). The
literature is replete with numerous articles discussing O’Bannon. For a sampling, see
Roger M. Groves, A Solution for the Pay for Play Dilemma of College Athletes: A
Novel Compensation Structure Tethered to Amateurism and Education, 17 TEX. REV.
ENT. & SPORTS 101 (2016); Wayne M. Cox, One Shining Moment to a Dark Unknown
Future: How the Evolution of the Right of Publicity Hammers Home the Final Nail in
the NCAA’s Argument on Amateurism in Collegiate Athletics, 80 ALB. L. REV. 195
(2016); David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Con-
fessions of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223
(2016); William W. Berry, Amending Amateurism Saving Intercollegiate Athletics
through Conference-Athlete Revenue Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551 (2016); Josephine
(Jo) R. Potuto et al., What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model,
and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879 (2014). It is also worth
noting that in 2008 the NCAA settled a previous case involving allegations relating to
antitrust concerns regarding limitations on scholarships. See Ron Zapata, NCAA,
Athletes End Antitrust Suit With $18.9 Million Deal, LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2008), https://
www.law360.com/articles/45673/ncaa-athletes-end-antitrust-suit-with-18-9m-deal
[https://perma.cc/HMS9-8WJB] (discussing $10 million settlement, along with $8.9
million in attorneys’ fees, “to settle antitrust claims that the organization unfairly
capped costs that can be covered under a student’s athletic scholarship” in resolving
White v. NCAA); Doug Lederman, Settlement Raises Questions for NCAA, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Feb. 4, 2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/02/04/ncaa
[https://perma.cc/7GYJ-X2X5] (discussing terms of settlement, including a fund for
class members to seek reimbursement for previous educational expenditures not cov-
ered by their scholarships).
96. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d, at 962–63.
97. Id. at 1007–08.
98. Id. at 1008.
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ously allowing member schools to provide full cost of attendance
scholarships.99 The Ninth Circuit, however, “vacate[d] the district
court’s judgment and permanent injunction insofar as they require[d]
the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to
$5,000 per year in deferred compensation.”100 In rejecting that portion
of the lower court’s injunction that required the potential creation of
$5,000 per year trust accounts, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
district court had “clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative to
allow students to receive NIL cash payments untethered to their edu-
cation expenses.”101
99. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2015) (also determining
that the district court’s “injunction requiring the NCAA to permit schools to provide
compensation up to the full cost of attendance was proper”).
100. Id. at 1079.
101. Id. at 1076. The court’s use of “NIL” refers to use of a student-athlete’s “name,
image, and likeness.” Id. at 1055. The Plaintiffs sought full en banc review of this
aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which was denied. Order Denying Rehearing
En Banc, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. 14-16601 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.na
cua.org/docs/default-source/new-cases-and-developments/new-documents/new-cases-
december-2015/obannon_v_ncaa_rehearing_enbanc_order.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://
perma.cc/BV5F-EJQZ]. Thereafter, both the plaintiffs and the NCAA separately
sought review by the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied both peti-
tions for certiorari. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. de-
nied 137 S. Ct. 277 (Oct. 3, 2016) (denying the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari);
NCAA v. O’Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (Oct. 3, 2016) (denying the NCAA’s petition for
certiorari).
The Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the holding that the NCAA violated antitrust law
in limiting scholarships at an amount below the full cost of attendance has become
relevant in other litigation. In another case also pending before United States District
Judge Claudia Wilken, the plaintiffs in Jenkins v. NCAA have claimed that the NCAA
and member institutions violated antitrust law by conspiring to cap so-called compen-
sation to student-athletes at the value of full scholarships. See Jenkins v. NCAA, No.
4:14-cv-02758, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103703, at *19 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 5, 2016) (indi-
cating that the plaintiffs have claimed “that, without the NCAA’s cap on compensa-
tion, schools would compete in recruiting student-athletes by providing more
generous compensation”). In August 2016, Judge Wilken rejected an NCAA motion
on the pleadings to dismiss the case based on the NCAA’s contention that O’Bannon
held that any remedy must be tethered to educational expenses. Id. at *22. Judge
Wilken acknowledged that O’Bannon limits the types of relief that the Jenkins plain-
tiffs may seek, but ruled that the pleadings were not limited to claims related to cash
compensation, and also included “other ‘benefits’ and ‘in-kind’ compensation.” Id. at
*22–23. As Professor Potuto has observed:
Jenkins claims that the antitrust laws forbid any NCAA limit on what
schools may pay an athlete to attend and compete. In other words, athletes
are entitled to receive whatever a free market for their services (or deep-
pocket big boosters) provides. The Jenkins litigation is a full-bore court fight
on the future of college sports. Jenkins believes that fundamental fairness
dictates that athletes share in the revenue pie they produce. Colleges and the
NCAA see such a result as creating a wild west for college recruiting, jeop-
ardizing the ability of schools to offer athletic opportunities to athletes who
compete in Olympic and other non-revenue sports, and, fundamentally, to
eliminate the line of demarcation that separates college from professional
sports. Jenkins, then, is the potential game-changer.
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The timing of the district court opinion in O’Bannon is significant
for appreciating its relevance to the Autonomy 5 conferences’ adop-
tion of cost of attendance scholarships in January 2015. Judge Wilken
issued her opinion in O’Bannon on August 8, 2014.102 As clarified by
an order dated August 19, 2014, the injunction in the case did not
“take effect until the start of [the] next FBS football and Division I
basketball recruiting cycle, which means August 1, 2015, the date on
which written offer letters can first be sent to student-athletes enroll-
ing in college after July 1, 2016.”103 In other words, the injunction was
set to apply prospectively beginning with scholarship offers made on
or after August 1, 2015 for student-athletes who would be enrolling at
NCAA member institutions in the sports of football and men’s bas-
ketball after July 1, 2016.104 Accordingly, when the Autonomy 5 con-
ferences convened in the first ever Autonomy 5 business session in
Washington, D.C. in January 2015, the O’Bannon injunction was
pending, but was not yet in effect.105 Nonetheless, the pendency of the
injunction and the portion of its remedy pertaining to cost of attend-
ance scholarships for football and men’s basketball was looming de-
cidedly in the background during the lead-up to the January 2015
vote. Moreover, although the NCAA had appealed the district court’s
decision in O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit did not hear oral arguments
until March 17, 2015, and did not release an opinion until September
30, 2015.106 Thus, the prospect of court-mandated cost of attendance
Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, The Alston/NCAA Settlement, JURIST (Mar. 10, 2017) [here-
inafter The Alston/NCAA Settlement], http://www.jurist.org/forum/2017/03/Josephine-
Potuto-alston-ncaa.php [https://perma.cc/WAX4-XV92]. Given O’Bannon, however,
as the Jenkins case proceeds the “plaintiffs must demonstrate a relationship between
the relief requested and educational expenses.” William W. Berry, Employee-Athletes,
Antitrust, and the Future of College Sports, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 279 (2017).
102. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). Coinci-
dentally, the NCAA DI Board of Directors approved the new governance model for
Division I on August 7, 2014, just a day prior to the trial court’s decision in O’Bannon.
See Michelle B. Hosick, Board Adopts New Division I Structure. NCAA (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-new-divi
sion-i-structure [https://perma.cc/VLA7-36CR] (discussing 16-2 vote in favor of
adopting new governance model).
103. O’Bannon v. NCAA, Order Granting Defendant NCAA’s Administrative
Motion for Clarification of Timing of Injunction, No. 09-cv-3329-CW, at 2 (Aug. 19,
2014), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/CF%20298%20-%202014-08-19%20Or
der%20Granting%20NCAA%20Motion%20for%20Clarification%20of%20Timi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F89V-KWC8].
104. Id.
105. The first Autonomy 5 business meeting under the new structure was January
17, 2015, at which time legislation was adopted to authorize cost of attendance schol-
arships. See Berkowitz, supra note 72 (discussing the first Autonomy 5 business meet-
ing and actions); Hosick, supra note 78 (discussing the first Autonomy 5 session).
106. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). Because the district court’s
injunction was set to become effective on August 1, 2015, while the appeal was still
pending, the NCAA sought an order from the Ninth Circuit to stay the injunction,
which the court of appeals granted on July 31, 2015. O’Bannon v. NCAA, Order
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scholarships for football and men’s basketball was decidedly a possi-
bility in January 2015 when the Autonomy 5 conferences held their
first business session.107
It is also important to note that the scope of the O’Bannon injunc-
tion was limited to the class of plaintiffs who participated in that litiga-
tion—namely football and men’s basketball student-athletes.108
Focusing solely on scholarship student-athletes in these sports (and
excluding walk-ons) meant that the class included a total of ninety-
eight scholarship student-athletes each year—eighty-five in football
and thirteen in men’s basketball.109 Obviously, these are all scholar-
ships established for male student-athletes. The NCAA could not
have realistically—or lawfully—adopted legislation authorizing full
cost of attendance scholarships only in these two sports because of
Title IX.110 Accordingly, when the Autonomy 5 conferences adopted
Granting Stay, No. 14-16601, at 2 (9th Cir. July 31, 2015), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/
datastore/general/2015/07/31/14-16601%207-31%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WM
Q-52YR]. The Author of this Article was a member of an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of
the Division Council that explored various possible recommendations for the DI
Board of Directors to consider had the stay not been granted.
107. In contrast, there was never any concerted effort to consider legislation to
adopt the other aspect of Judge Wilken’s remedy in O’Bannon to permit student-
athletes to earn $5,000 per year in trust for each year in which they were academically
eligible. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Ultimately, of
course, the Ninth Circuit vacated this aspect of the district court’s injunction.
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
108. See id. at 1055–56 (describing the class).
109. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, §§ 15.5.6.1, 15.5.5.1 (authorizing
an annual limit of 85 total counters in football and 13 in men’s basketball).
110. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2017) (requiring institutions to provide an equality of
opportunities for both sexes in intercollegiate sports). See also Title IX Legal Manual,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix [https://perma.cc/S97S-DM4P]
(last visited July 26, 2017); Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/5CB5-9X
KZ] (last visited July 26, 2017) (providing general overviews of Title IX and its appli-
cation to most educational programs). As an example, assume that the amount neces-
sary to increase a full scholarship award to Institution X’s cost of attendance over
Institution X’s former level of allowable athletics grant in aid is $5,000. If Institution
X were to comply with the O’Bannon injunction and award ninety-eight full cost of
attendance scholarships to all football and men’s basketball counters, that would in-
crease the amount spent on male student-athletes by almost a half-million dollars per
year (98 X $5,000 = $490,000). To comply with Title IX, Institution X would need to
spend a proportionate additional amount of resources on its women’s athletics pro-
grams. See generally Lisa M. Scott, Comment, The NCAA’s Losing Battle: What Hap-
pens when Paying Student-Athletes Meets Title IX?, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285 (2017);
Guidance on Cost of Attendance Title IX Compliance, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND. (July
23, 2015), https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/advocate/title-ix-issues/coa-title-
ix/ [https://perma.cc/5FTT-WX4A]; Jane McManus, Pressure to Pay Student-Athletes
Carries Question of Title IX, ESPNW.COM (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esp
nw/culture/feature/article/15201865/pressure-pay-student-athletes-carries-question-ti
tle-ix [https://perma.cc/UM7W-SU2T].
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the bylaw change to permit institutions to award full cost of attend-
ance scholarships in January 2015, the measure applied to all sports.111
111. Under the former version of bylaw § 15.02.5, a “full grant-in-aid” was defined
as “financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and board, and required
course-related books.” NCAA MANUAL 2014–15, supra note 28, § 15.02.5. After the
2015 amendments, however, the text of bylaw § 15.02.5 changed to define a “full
grant-in-aid” as “financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and board,
books, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of
attendance” as calculated for that institution. NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4,
§ 15.02.5. See also Hosick, supra note 78 (describing the Autonomy 5 conferences’
adoption of cost of attendance legislation).
There has been an interesting post-script to the O’Bannon litigation. On March 21,
2017, Judge Claudia Wilken granted preliminary approval of a settlement in the Al-
ston litigation against the NCAA. See Steve Berkowitz, Preliminary Settlement Ap-
proval Given in NCAA Cost of Attendance Case, USA TODAY SPORTS (Mar. 22,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2017/03/21/ncaa-full-cost-of-at
tendance-athletic-scholarship-case/99477648/ [https://perma.cc/7GZ8-4FXN] (describ-
ing the NCAA’s $209 million settlement). For the full order giving preliminary ap-
proval to the settlement, see Amended Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, In Re: NCAA Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.grantinaidset-
tlement.com/media/882368/03-29-17_amended_order_granting_plaintiffs__unoppos
ed_motion_for_preliminary_approval_of_class_actio.pdf [https://perma.cc/32P3-NA
DK]. Shawne Alston was a former West Virginia football student-athlete who, along
with other former student-athletes, brought an antitrust action on behalf of a class of
DI FBS football, DI men’s basketball, and DI women’s basketball student-athletes
against the NCAA and eleven conferences seeking, in part, damages for the differ-
ence between the previously capped amounts of full athletic grants-in-aid (scholar-
ships) and the full cost of attendance at their respective institutions. See Consolidated
Amended Complaint, In Re: NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-
2541-CW (July 11, 2014), https://www.hbsslaw.com/uploads/case_downloads/files/
case_pdfs/NCAA%20Scholarships/Consolidated%20Amended%20Complaint%20-
%20Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSH6-34TN]. The case had been consolidated with
Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 4:14-cv-02758-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) and assigned to
Judge Wilken (who had also presided over O’Bannon). The March 2017 preliminary
settlement related only to the Alston case, however.
In brief, the Alston plaintiffs contended that because the NCAA (and the confer-
ence defendants) had violated the antitrust laws in setting scholarships at an amount
less than full cost of attendance (as had been determined by O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802
F.3d 1049, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2015)), these antitrust violations also occurred prior to
the effective date of Judge Wilken’s injunction in O’Bannon and prior to the NCAA’s
adoption of cost of attendance legislation in 2015. Accordingly, Alston challenged the
former “Division I rule that capped athletics scholarships at tuition, fees, room,
board, and books . . . and sought the difference between such a capped scholarship
and full cost of attendance for any year from 2010 forward in which he and other class
members received a capped scholarship.” Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, The Alston/
NCAA Settlement, supra note 101. Professor Potuto further commented: “It could be
said that the Alston settlement simply extended to athletes from 2010 to 2015 a schol-
arship award that they would have received had the cap been eliminated sooner.” Id.
In addition, “[b]ecause cost of attendance varies from school to school, the amount
paid also depends on the school the athlete attended. It is expected that on average,
the settlement will pay out $7,000 to each athlete in the class.” Id.
The NCAA agreed to provide the $208.7 million settlement fund in Alston “to set-
tle the monetary claims portion of the grant-in-aid class-action lawsuit. Although the
lawsuit included conference defendants, the NCAA Board of Governors determined
the settlement will be funded entirely from NCAA reserves, and no conference or
member schools will be required to contribute.” NCAA Establishes Fund for Student-
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2. Time Demands
When the DI Board adopted the new governance structure, one of
the identified areas of autonomy ceded to the Autonomy 5 confer-
ences pertained to time demands faced by student-athletes.112 The DI
Board Steering Committee’s report stated the following:
Given the visibility and demands associated with meeting expecta-
tions existing for highly-competitive intercollegiate athletics pro-
grams, the five conferences and their 65 member institutions would
be granted autonomy to update rules and policies governing time
demands in order to permit a more appropriate balance between
athletics and other student-athlete activities.113
Although several time demands proposals were on the agenda at the
second annual Autonomy 5 business session in January 2016, there
was not a consensus to adopt any particular substantive measure at
that time.114 Instead, the Autonomy 5 schools adopted “a resolution
vowing to create new proposals addressing the issue” that would be
Athletes, NCAA (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/ncaa-establishes-fund-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/4LYZ-NVJM]. The
NCAA indicated that the “settlement class members include Division I men’s and
women’s basketball and FBS football student-athletes from the 2009–10 academic
year through the 2016–17 academic year who did not receive cost of attendance as a
part of their scholarship[s].” Id. The NCAA also contended that “the agreement
maintains cost of attendance as an appropriate dividing line between collegiate and
professional sports. In fact, the NCAA and conferences only settled this case because
the terms are consistent with Division I financial aid rules, which allow athletics-based
aid up to the full cost of obtaining a college education.” Id. This is an important point.
Scholarships pegged to the full cost of attendance at a member university relate di-
rectly to the expenses of a college education. The Alston settlement “does not change
the NCAA’s stance that college athletes are students, not employees, of their univer-
sities.” Potuto, The Alston/NCAA Settlement, supra note 101. As Professor Potuto
observed, “The Alston settlement is grounded in educational values, therefore, and
capped at the total amount of . . . expenses [for cost of attendance]. Paying the full
cost of educational expenses does not constitute pay for play any more than paying
any lesser scholarship amount did.” Id.
It is noteworthy, however, that the settlement in Alston pertains only to the class
members involved in that litigation—student-athletes in the sports of FBS football
and DI men’s and women’s basketball. It does not extend to student-athletes in other
sports. For a full copy of the settlement agreement, see Settlement Agreement, In Re:
NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (Feb. 3, 2017), http:/
/www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017-02-03%20-%20Dkt%20560.1%20-%20Exhibit
%20A.PDF [https://perma.cc/N39Y-68LC].
112. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 31 (describing time demands as
an autonomy area).
113. Id.
114. See Karen Gross, Time Demands on Student-Athletes, Part 2: Listen, Under-
stand and Lead, COLLEGEAD (Jan. 28, 2016), http://collegead.com/time-demands-on-
student-athletes-part-2-listen-understand-and-lead/  [https://perma.cc/4C8V-T36N]
(observing that the prospect of “significant recommendations” regarding time de-
mands on student-athletes was deferred for a year, and that the submitted “legislative
proposals were not discussed publicly in depth, were not voted upon substantively and
were essentially . . . not considered sufficiently well-thought through to be ready for
adoption”).
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considered at the January 2017 NCAA Convention Autonomy 5 meet-
ing.115 Accordingly, three specific concepts were referred for further
review and development including a “prohibition of athletics activity
for a consecutive eight-hour period overnight,” a limitation on athlet-
ics activities for “at least two weeks at the end of a season,” and assur-
ing that “[a] full day off during the week that addresses the impact of
travel time.”116 Some of the student-athlete representatives at the
2016 Autonomy session expressed frustration and disappointment
with the failure to act.117
The year’s delay, however, contributed to the successful develop-
ment of a set of time demands proposals that were subsequently
adopted at the January 2017 NCAA convention.118 In particular, the
Autonomy 5 conferences adopted legislation that would preclude re-
quired athletics activities overnight for a continuous eight-hour pe-
riod, require at least seven days off at the end of a season and an
additional fourteen days off during the regular academic year, gener-
ally prohibit a travel day as counting as a day off, and require that
institutions develop an annual time-management plan for each
sport.119 The 2017 Autonomy 5 legislation also created a definition of
“required athletically related activities” which goes beyond already
countable activities—such as practice time—to include other activities
that create demands on student-athletes’ time, such as participation in
team promotions, recruiting, media events, fundraising, and more.120
115. Michelle B. Hosick, NCAA, Conferences Refer Time Demands Proposals for
Further Study (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news
/conferences-refer-time-demands-proposals-further-study [https://perma.cc/CZ4T-
5ANA].
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Jake New, Kicking the Can?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/01/18/athletes-express-frustration-lack-sig
nificant-legislation-ncaa-meeting [https://perma.cc/ZS9H-S8CM] (indicating that
many of the student-athlete representatives at the Autonomy session “were vocal crit-
ics of the decision to table the proposals” and lacked a sense of urgency). As an exam-
ple of these time demands, NCAA study results that were released in January 2016
indicated that football student-athletes at FBS schools self-reported “spending 42
hours per week on their sport.” Id. See also NCAA GOALS Study of the Student-
Athlete Experience—Initial Summary of Findings, NCAA (Jan. 2016), http://www.
ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_2015_summary_jan2016_final_20160627.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UZ3S-KGKM] (summarizing survey data from over 21,000 student-
athletes).
118. See Jake New, A True Day Off, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/23/power-five-leagues-adopt-new-rules-lessen
ing-time-demands [https://perma.cc/RJ25-4LQZ] (summarizing the time demands
measures adopted by the Autonomy 5 conferences).
119. See id. (summarizing the votes on the various proposals); see also Michelle B.
Hosick, 2017 NCAA Convention Legislation: Division I, NCAA (Jan. 13, 2017), http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/2017-ncaa-convention-legislation-
division-i [https://perma.cc/3XTX-G6WQ] (listing the rules changes set forth in the
Autonomy 5 proposals).
120. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 17.02.14 (setting forth definition
of “required athletically related activities”). The new time demands legislation then
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As one of the Big 12 student-athlete representatives, Ty Darlington
summarized on the convention floor: “It doesn’t matter what it is,
whether it’s constructive or not constructive. There should be time
[off] in every week where a student-athlete can use that time as they
see fit.”121
Although it took an extra year and was not without its critics, the
adopted time demands legislation represented a key success for the
new governance structure.122 The Autonomy 5 membership responded
to student-athlete challenges to provide some relief from the time de-
mands expected by their coaches. One particular portion of the new
legislation that will be interesting to see evolve is the requirement that
each sport create an annual time management plan.123 In particular,
these plans must provide student-athletes with a schedule for, and ad-
equate notice of, countable athletically related activities such as prac-
tice.124 Institutions must also provide adequate notice when the
previously provided schedule for practice or other activities
changes.125 Importantly, at the end of each academic year, the head
coach, the athletics director, the FAR, and at least one student-athlete
representative will review and evaluate compliance with the sport’s
plan over the preceding year.126 In addition, the university’s president
must review the findings for each annual review.127 These annual re-
views will also no doubt be very time-consuming, but they should pro-
vide an important check on whether each sport has provided the
expected time off and appropriate notice of practice schedules and
schedule changes.
utilizes this term in precluding such activities on student-athletes’ days off. See id.
§§ 17.1.7.6–17.1.7.8.
121. See New, supra note 118 (quoting Ty Darlington, a former football student-
athlete from the University of Oklahoma).
122. For criticism of the new measures, see Jon Solomon, NCAA Time Demands
Rules Ignore the Biggest Problem in the Situation: the Games, CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan.
20, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-time-demands-rules-
ignore-the-biggest-problem-in-the-situation-the-games/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9F-GD
JY] (arguing that the proposals had not addressed the problem of too many games
during a season in some sports); B. David Ridpath, Lessening Time Demands on Col-
lege Athletes Is Not Rocket Science, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bdavidridpath/2016/11/10/lessening-time-demands-on-college-athletes-is-not-
rocket-science-but-we-make-it-too-complicated/#61b60b26159a [https://perma.cc/
AT6B-TQAL] (suggesting that the rules setting limits on countable athletically re-
lated activities, such as practice time, “be drastically reduced and better managed”).
123. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 17.1.8 (requiring institutions to
develop a student-athlete time-management plan for each varsity sport).
124. Id. §§ 17.1.8 (a)–(b).
125. Id. § 17.1.8 (c). Presumably, the sport’s coaches will provide such notice.
126. Id. § 17.1.8.1.
127. Id.
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3. Good Leadership
A governance structure, no matter how well crafted, is only as good
as its leaders. In early 2015, the DI Council elected Jim Phillips, the
athletics director at Northwestern University, as the new Council’s
first chair.128 Phillips proved to be an exceptional choice. The Author
has served on the Council since its formation in January 2015 and can
attest to the fact that Jim Phillips was a tremendous first leader for the
Council. In particular, Phillips was adept at facilitating the Council’s
creation of a functioning and effective substructure for the new Coun-
cil’s governance model. He also successfully and capably managed the
disparities and occasional tensions among the representatives of
thirty-two different conferences representing all segments of DI. The
Council and all of DI benefited from his leadership. After Phillips
served in the role for two-plus years, his term ended. Blake James, the
athletics director from the University of Miami, was then elected to
chair the Council beginning in June 2017.129 James served on the
Council since its inception in January 2015, and he “is a tremendous fit
to lead the group moving forward.”130
B. Challenges
Although there have been notable successes following the January
2015 roll-out of the new NCAA DI governance structure, there have
been and will continue to be several challenges. This Section will ad-
dress a few of these challenges. First, the Author will discuss the con-
tinuing concern about the lack of any significant faculty presence on
the new DI governing Council. Then, the Author will describe some
tension points and potential tension points with regard to the, at
times, uneasy alliance among the thirty-two conferences in DI as it
pertains to student-athlete scholarships. Finally, the Author will com-
ment on whether the new structure will be sufficiently nimble to ad-
dress challenges in an efficient and expedited manner.
1. Dearth of FARS
In late 2014, the NCAA DI Board named the forty initial appoin-
tees to the Council. The 1A FAR Board of Directors publicly ex-
pressed extreme disappointment that the Board appointed only three
128. Michelle B. Hosick, Phillips to Chair DI Council, NCAA (Feb. 2, 2015), http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/phillips-chair-di-council [https://
perma.cc/H2UB-JNTR]. As the Council chair, Phillips also filled a newly created ath-
letics director seat on the DI Board of Directors. Id.
129. See Michelle B. Hosick, New DI Council Chair Brings Strong Experience, Vi-
sion, NCAA (June 27, 2017), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
new-di-council-chair-brings-strong-experience-vision [https://perma.cc/7J79-E7YP]
(discussing James and his election as Council chair).
130. See id. (quoting Jim Phillips).
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FARs to the initial slate of forty members.131 In its release, the 1A
FAR Board questioned whether the configuration reflected “a com-
mitment to the collegiate model,” and observed that “[i]f academic
values are to have significant relevance in intercollegiate athletics, it
strikes us as inconsistent to include only minor representation by
faculty.”132 Sally Jenkins, a sportswriter for the Washington Post,
echoed this sentiment: “That’s right. The body in charge of reform, of
curing the NCAA of its academic scandals and overseeing sports on
college campuses, will have just three actual professors — you know,
teachers, that sort of person.”133 In a similar vein, in the Author’s role
as President of 1A FAR, the Author communicated the following to
NCAA President Mark Emmert and David Berst, who was then the
Vice President for Division I, shortly after the appointments were
announced:
While I am personally excited about the opportunity to serve on the
new Council, my board and other FARs are quite disappointed by
the overall dearth of FARs on the new Council. The outcome re-
flects a regression from our inclusion in the former governance
structure and runs counter to the many assurances that we received
from the leadership throughout the governance redesign process.134
During the course of the NCAA DI governance redesign, the DI
Board had sought input from across the membership.135 In response,
the 1A FAR Board initially advocated that the FBS conferences and
member schools split off from the rest of Division I and become a
new, separate division within the NCAA.136 The 1A FAR Board rec-
131. News Release, 1A Faculty Athletics Representatives (FAR), Where is the
Faculty Voice?, NCAA DI Board Needs to Address the Issue (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file
with author). By way of contrast, the initial slate included twenty-seven athletics di-
rectors. Id.
132. Id. For a listing of all of the initial appointments to the forty-member Council
by both name and position, see Michelle B. Hosick, Board Appoints Council Mem-
bers, NCAA (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
board-appoints-council-members [https://perma.cc/F4ZM-4UBX] (delineating full ini-
tial roster).
133. Sally Jenkins, Who Can Fix College Sports? NCAA Seems to Think the Same
People Who Broke Them, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/sports/colleges/who-can-fix-college-sports-ncaa-seems-to-think-the-same-
people-who-broke-them/2014/12/05/c2798800-7ca6-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.ht
ml?utm_term=.84b9cc3dd467 [https://perma.cc/8SXV-E92M].
134. E-mail from Brian Shannon, President, 1A FAR, to Mark Emmert, President,
NCAA, and David Berst, Vice President for Division I, NCAA (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:01
AM CST) (on file with author). The Author was one of the three FARs initially ap-
pointed to the Council. See Michelle B. Hosick, supra note 132 (noting that Brian
Shannon is representing “the Division 1A FARs on the Council”).
135. See Michelle B. Hosick, Division I Board Asks Membership to Help Streamline
Structure, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
news/division-i-board-asks-membership-help-streamline-structure-1 [https://perma.cc/
2698-CP5U] (discussing Board’s request for input).
136. See Allie Grasgreen, Faculty on the NCAA’s Future, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct.
4, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/10/04/faculty-advocate-new-ncaa-
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ommended the formation of this fourth division to allow the FBS to
be able to “group together institutions that are more closely aligned in
resources dedicated to athletics programs and in the types of issues
faced.”137 The detailed proposal identified several potential enhance-
ments to the then-existing NCAA governmental process, including
creating the ability to utilize smaller, more-focused governance
groups, an opportunity to include more senior level athletics adminis-
trators and FARs within those groups, and the means to permit the
groups to focus more directly on FBS issues.138
A primary focus for the FARs is education. Indeed, member institu-
tions of the NCAA share a commitment that intercollegiate athletics
be a vital part of the college educational experience.139 The partici-
pants are identified as student-athletes, and the NCAA has identified
a “basic purpose” of the organization is a commitment “to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so do-
ing, [to] retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate ath-
letics and professional sports.”140 In turn, the NCAA’s list of seven
“core values” includes three specific commitments to the successful
overlap between college athletics and academics.141 These athletic/ac-
ademic tenets include a shared belief in the “collegiate model of ath-
letics,” the “supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays in the
higher education mission,” and the “pursuit of excellence in both aca-
demics and athletics.”142
division-far-governance-plan [https://perma.cc/6YSV-EE22] (reporting that the 1A
FAR Board advocated “for a new, separate division (as opposed to a subset of Divi-
sion 1) for FBS programs”).
137. 1A FAR BOARD, PRINCIPLES AND MODEL FOR NEW GOVERNANCE STRUC-
TURE 3, https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/1A%20FAR
%20Board%20Principles%20and%20Model%20for%20New%20NCAA%20Govern
ance%20Structure.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N9X-PZQL].
138. Id. Although advocating for a separate FBS division for purposes of NCAA
governance, the FARs urged that the overall structure would “leave intact the Divi-
sion I championship structure in which FBS institutions compete.” Id. at 4. See also
Bush, supra note 93, at 5–6 (advocating that the Autonomy 5 conferences “should
separate from the NCAA and form independent athletic associations . . . [that] should
contract with other associations and third party entities for inter-association and post-
season competitions.”).
139. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 1.3.1 (specifying that the “com-
petitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of
the educational system”).
140. Id.
141. NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values
[https://perma.cc/HL2T-QLJ2] (last visited June 29, 2017).
142. Id. The NCAA’s full list of core values provides the following:
The Association – through its member institutions, conferences and national
office staff – shares a belief in and commitment to:
• The collegiate model of athletics in which students participate as an avo-
cation, balancing their academic, social and athletics experiences.
• The highest levels of integrity and sportsmanship.
• The pursuit of excellence in both academics and athletics.
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Given this shared emphasis on both athletics and academics, during
the NCAA governance redesign process, the 1A FAR Board of Direc-
tors initially urged that the new governance model include an equal
number of both FARs and senior athletics administrators.143 The 1A
FAR Board reasoned:
Our universities, and the NCAA as an association, continually es-
pouse a commitment to the collegiate model, with its focus on over-
all student-athlete well-being. Policy for intercollegiate athletics
should be adopted and problems should be solved in a manner that
not only embodies – but, equally, is seen to embody – the values of
higher education and the enhancement of all facets of the collegiate
student experience, including those directly related to the student-
athlete experience.144
In addition, the 1A FAR Board tried to persuade the NCAA DI
Board that the national governing structure should be reflective of
typical campus approaches in which the Presidents and Chancellors
regularly seek and rely on the input of both athletics directors and
FARs.145 The 1A FAR Board added:
In sum, if the collegiate model means anything, it must mean that
college athletic issues need to be considered and resolved in a man-
ner consistent with the campus ethos and campus values. Few, if
any, college athletic issues are either exclusively athletic or exclu-
sively academic. Our governance model should be structured to re-
flect that reality. If we do so, we will have positioned our
governance design to better address and resolve college athletic is-
sues within a collegiate model framework. Moreover, doing so will
• The supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher edu-
cation mission and in enhancing the sense of community and strengthen-
ing the identity of member institutions.
• An inclusive culture that fosters equitable participation for student-ath-
letes and career opportunities for coaches and administrators from di-
verse backgrounds.
• Respect for institutional autonomy and philosophical differences.
• Presidential leadership of intercollegiate athletics at the campus, confer-
ence and national levels.
Id. (emphasis in original). The NCAA staff provides this list of core values as part of
the meeting materials for all Division I Council meetings.
143. See Letter from Brian D. Shannon, President, 1A FAR Board, to Nathan O.
Hatch, Chair, NCAA Division I Board of Directors, Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.oneafar.
org/archive/2014_archive/letter_to_President_Hatch.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q58-
Y8HC] (urging that “[h]aving an equal number of FARs to work hand-in-hand with
senior athletics administrators at the Council level will assure that issues are vetted
and considered through both an athletics and a campus/academic lens”) (emphasis in
original).
144. See id. (emphasis omitted) (also arguing that the “goals and ethos of our col-
leges and universities must be front and center in the consideration and adoption of
policies and bylaws that govern intercollegiate athletics”).
145. See id. (adding that “[n]o FAR disputes that ADs are, and must be, the ones
directly charged with administering athletics departments . . . [and] that ADs have
such responsibilities on a 24/7 basis” but pointing out that “college athletics also has a
24/7 college/academic component”) (emphasis omitted).
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also allow the NCAA to be best positioned to respond to what we
believe will be continuing external criticism that the “college” part
of collegiate athletics is no longer relevant.146
The 1A FAR Board was not the only group urging the inclusion of a
significant population of FARs on the new DI Council. The Faculty
Athletics Representative Association (“FARA”), which represents
the FARs at all three divisions of the NCAA, argued that, in addition
to “a strong athletic director presence” on the Council, it was also
“necessary to have a strong FAR presence on the Council.”147 FARA
provided the following rationale:
FARs have practical daily experience in all aspects of the academic
endeavors of athletes and they also understand the importance of
the athletic component of their education. Inclusion of the on-cam-
pus perspectives of both FARs and ADs ensures the best possible
likelihood of maintaining and promoting the collegiate model for
athletics.148
These arguments, however, were ultimately unsuccessful in per-
suading the DI Board to appoint a significant number of FARs to the
Council. Instead, the final Council design designated only two slots
specifically for FARs, and the initial make-up of the forty-member
Council, as seated in January 2015, included only three FARs.149 In
response to the concerns raised by 1A FAR and others, the DI Board
appeared to be troubled with regard to the diversity of the Council
and expressed “the need for a wider range of viewpoints on the
body.”150 As one approach to expanding the diversity of nominees (in
terms not only of race and gender, but also with regard to positional
146. Id.
147. Memorandum from Frank Webbe, President, FARA, to Nathan O. Hatch,
Chair, NCAA Division I Board of Directors, Mar. 14, 2014, http://farawebsite.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/EC_ltr_to-Steering_Commitee_0314_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C4M5-LNNQ].
148. Id. In an additional letter commenting on the NCAA governance redesign,
FARA cautioned, “If FARs are not well represented in the new governance structure
at the Council level and below, the FARA Executive Committee’s concern is that the
collegiate model’s credibility will be severely weakened or lost.” Letter from Frank
Webbe, President, FARA, to Nathan O. Hatch, Chair, NCAA Division I Board of
Directors, May 15, 2014, http://farawebsite.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Hatch_
ltr_05152014_FARA-D1-governance-position-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5U-
5YV6].
149. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 6 (identifying the addition of
two positions designated solely for faculty); Hosick, supra note 132 (identifying the
full initial roster by name and position). Separate from the two designated positions,
the Board appointed only one FAR as a conference representative—Tim Day, the
Iowa State University FAR from the Big 12 Conference. Id.
150. Michelle B. Hosick, New Board Starts Discussion on Future of Division I,
NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-
board-starts-discussions-future-division-i [https://perma.cc/6DYW-VE4Z]. The DI
Board had rejected the initial slate of nominees in October 2014 and asked for the
submission of a new slate because it was dissatisfied “with the lack of diversity in
ethnicity, gender and experience offered by the conferences in October.” Id.
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experience), the DI Board adopted a policy that required conferences
to submit multiple nominees “to contribute to preset diversity objec-
tives and to include at least one person who isn’t an athletics direc-
tor.”151 The proof remains in the pudding, however. As of this writing
in August 2017, there are four FARs among the forty members of the
DI Council.152 This means that only 10% of the members of the pri-
mary policy-setting body for Division I shared governance issues
(non-autonomy) are faculty members, despite the importance of edu-
cation to the enterprise. The DI Board should rectify this shortcom-
ing. Indeed, “FARs comprised 20 percent of the members of the
precursor Division I governance structure.”153
2. Athletics Scholarships
Despite the legislation adopted by the Autonomy 5 conferences to
provide cost of attendance scholarships, there are issues remaining
pertaining to athletics scholarships. Only certain NCAA sports have
requirements that all athletics scholarships awarded by institutions be
full scholarships, identified in the NCAA Bylaws as “full grant[s]-in-
151. Id.
152. See Division I Council, NCAA, http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees
roster.jsp?CommitteeName=1COUNCIL [https://perma.cc/Y2F2-LNVV] (last visited
Aug. 3, 2017) (providing the roster of the forty Council members). The Author will
add, however, that nothing in this critique regarding the limited number of FARs in
the Council structure should be viewed as criticism of the initial or current member-
ship of the Council. It has been the Author’s experience as a Council member that the
athletics directors, conference commissioners, other athletics administrators, FARs,
and student-athletes who serve or have served on the Council have been exception-
ally hard-working, experienced, and dedicated leaders. Moreover, the NCAA has a
talented array of accomplished senior staff who go above and beyond in supporting
the work of the Council and its substructure.
153. See Potuto, Two, Four, Six, Eight, supra note 12, at 292 n.33 (adding, “Ironi-
cally, the reduction of the faculty role coincided with increasingly vocal and strident
claims that there is no longer a collegiate model of athletics, and that those who com-
pete in football and men’s basketball are professionals, not students.”). This is more
than just a matter of quotas or counting noses. As Professor Potuto has reasoned:
Faculty by training and inclination are skeptical. They rely on research and
validated data to drive decisions. Their skill set runs to measured analysis
and considered evaluation. FAR status outside the athletic department dis-
tances them from athletic pressures, including those that head coaches bring
to bear.
Id. at 312. See also AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., THE STUDENT-ATHLETE, ACADEMIC
INTEGRITY, AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 4 (2016), http://www.acenet.edu/
news-room/Documents/ACE-Academic-Integrity-Athletics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
689E-WVZB] (describing “the important ‘connective tissue’ and watchdog role FARs
can play on campus when it comes to academic integrity and intercollegiate athlet-
ics”); Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, Professors Need Not Apply, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (May
19, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/05/19/new-ncaa-governance-
structure-marginalizes-faculty-members-essay [https://perma.cc/C54X-E6FJ] (criticiz-
ing the DI Board’s Steering Committee for failing to include a greater number of
FARs in the structure and prompting readers to “[t]ry defining a university without
mentioning faculty. It can’t be done.”).
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aid.”154 These sports include football, men’s and women’s basketball,
women’s volleyball, women’s gymnastics, and women’s tennis.155 In
addition, the bylaws place limits on the total number of full grants-in-
aid that can be awarded in each of these “head count” sports. For
example, at FBS institutions there is an “annual limit of 25 on the
number of initial counters . . . and an annual limit of 85 on the total
number of counters (including initial counters) for football.”156 In
turn, men’s basketball and women’s basketball are both “head count”
sports and are limited to thirteen and fifteen full scholarships,
respectively.157
It is important to note, however, that for the majority of NCAA
sports, student-athletes do not typically earn full athletics scholar-
ships. These sports, ranging from baseball to track and field to golf,
soccer, lacrosse, and even fencing and bowling, are identified as
“equivalency” sports.158 That is, for each equivalency sport, an institu-
tion may award full or fractional scholarships to members of the team,
but there is a cap tied to an equivalent number of full scholarships.159
In addition, for these sports, the cap on the number of allowed schol-
arships per team tends to be much smaller than the total number of
student-athletes on the team’s roster. For example, in men’s baseball,
there is an annual cap of 11.7 scholarship equivalencies that can be
awarded to no more than twenty-seven student-athletes who are iden-
tified as “counters”—i.e., recipients of institutional financial aid.160
Similarly, ice hockey has a cap of eighteen scholarships that can be
awarded to no more than thirty student-athletes on the squad.161
154. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 15.02.5 (defining a “full grant-
in-aid” as “financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and
other expenses related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of attendance” as
calculated for that institution).
155. Id. §§ 15.5.5, 15.5.6, 15.5.2.1.
156. Id. § 15.5.6.1. In turn, a “counter” is defined as “an individual who is receiving
institutional financial aid that is countable against the aid limitations in a sport.” Id.
§ 15.02.3.
157. Id. §§ 15.5.5.1, 15.5.5.2. Correspondingly, women’s gymnastics, women’s vol-
leyball, and women’s tennis have caps of twelve, twelve, and eight full scholarships,
respectively. Id. § 15.5.2.1. Institutions may have team rosters that exceed the cap
limits in these head count sports, but additional student-athletes are not eligible for
any athletics financial aid and are considered to be “walk-ons.” For example, although
FBS football has a cap of eighty-five total scholarship counters, as many as “105 stu-
dent-athletes . . . may engage in practice activities prior to the institution’s first day of
classes or the institution’s first contest, whichever occurs earlier.” Id. § 17.10.2.1.2.
158. See id. §§ 15.5.3, 15.5.4, 15.5.7, 15.5.8 (defining and describing limits on schol-
arships in numerous sports).
159. See id. §§ 15.5.3.1, 15.5.3.2 (listing maximum scholarship equivalency limits for
an array of sports, and describing the method of calculating the equivalencies).
160. See id. § 15.5.4 (providing for “an annual limit of 11.7 on the value of financial
aid awards (equivalencies) to counters and an annual limit of 27 on the total number
of counters in baseball”). In addition, in the sport of baseball there is a minimum floor
requirement that each financial aid package must be at least “25 percent of an
equivalency.” Id. § 15.5.4.1.
161. Id. § 15.5.7.
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Unlike baseball and ice hockey, other equivalency sports do not
have a cap on the total number of student-athlete counters who may
receive institutional financial aid, but there are strict caps on the num-
ber of equivalency scholarships available per sport.162 For example,
women’s softball has a cap of twelve scholarship equivalencies, which
is the value of twelve full scholarships.163 A softball roster, however,
will typically include significantly more than twelve student-athletes
(particularly given that nine student-athletes are on the field at any
one time). Although an institution has the discretion to award a full
scholarship to a particular student-athlete in an equivalency sport such
as softball, the total amount of aid awarded to the members of the
team cannot exceed the cap for the sport. Accordingly, fractional
(partial) scholarships are typically the norm in equivalency sports.164
In 2017, the NCAA settled the Alston litigation. The settlement ad-
dressed the shortfall between the former limits on athletics scholar-
ships and full cost of attendance for “Division I men’s and women’s
basketball and FBS football student-athletes from the 2009–10 aca-
demic year through the 2016–17 academic year who did not receive
cost of attendance as a part of their scholarship.”165 The settlement,
however, did not extend to student-athletes in other head-count
sports, or to student-athletes in any of the equivalency sports.166
Whether student-athletes in other head-count sports for the years cov-
ered by the Alston settlement pursue any form of action remains to be
seen.
The DI governance structure must confront two distinct scholarship
issues regarding equivalency sports. First, after adoption of the cost of
162. The caps for the total number of financial aid awards for an array of additional
men’s sports include the following:
Cross Country/Track and Field (12.6), Fencing (4.5), Golf (4.5), Gymnastics
(6.3), Lacrosse (12.6), Rifle (3.6), Skiing (6.3), Soccer (9.9), Swimming and
Diving (9.9), Tennis (4.5), Volleyball (4.5), Water Polo (4.5), and Wrestling
(9.9).
Id. § 15.5.3.1.1. Correspondingly, the caps for the total number of financial aid awards
for the remaining women’s sports include the following:
Bowling (5), Cross Country/Track and Field (18), Equestrian (15), Fencing
(5), Field Hockey (12), Golf (6), Lacrosse (12), Rowing (20), Rugby (12),
Skiing (7), Soccer (14), Softball (12), Swimming and Diving (14), Triathlon
(6.5), and Water Polo (8).
Id. § 15.5.3.1.2.
163. Id. § 15.5.3.1.2.
164. The bylaws further define an equivalency calculation as a fractional amount of
a full scholarship, and specify that the “sum of all fractional and maximum awards
received by counters shall not exceed the total limit for the sport in question for the
academic year as a whole.” Id. § 15.5.3.2(b)–(c).
165. NCAA Establishes Fund for Student-Athletes, NCAA (Feb. 3, 2017), http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-establishes-fund-student-ath-
letes [https://perma.cc/DX3E-6QP8].
166. See generally Potuto, The Alston/NCAA Settlement, supra note 101 (observing
that “[w]hat the Alston settlement (and the O’Bannon case before it) does not ad-
dress is scholarship limits for athletes in other sports.”).
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attendance legislation, some institutions questioned how it might be
applied to equivalency sports.167 As summarized by an Ad Hoc Finan-
cial Aid Issues Working Group appointed by the Council, “[T]he ex-
pansion of the legislation [was] intended to provide student-athletes
with additional funds to cover cost of attendance; however, as written,
the legislation allows schools to provide additional funds to student-
athletes who previously did not receive athletically related financial
aid.”168 If an institution were to take the latter path, to use new cost of
attendance funds for additional student-athletes, then “an increase in
roster sizes may result, or at least an increase in the number of coun-
ters within the roster.”169 Many institutions within DI were concerned
that schools with greater resources that elect to provide cost of attend-
ance scholarships across all sports would use those funds not to en-
hance existing student-athletes’ financial aid awards, but to
“stockpile” additional student-athletes via “roster creep” or “counter
creep.”170
The foregoing concern can best be illustrated by an example. Sup-
pose that Big State University opts to provide cost of attendance
scholarships in all sports. In addition, one of the school’s sponsored
sports is women’s softball, an equivalency sport with a cap of twelve
total scholarship equivalencies.171 Suppose further that it would cost
$4,000 to increase the total amount of the formerly allowed scholar-
ship limit to the full cost of attendance at Big State, and that Big State
had twenty-four student-athletes on the softball roster who received
partial or full athletic scholarships when the cost of attendance rules
became effective. Accordingly, once cost of attendance scholarships
became permissible, the softball scholarship budget would increase by
$48,000.172 If Big State opted not to increase its roster, that $48,000
167. See NCAA DIVISION I COUNCIL AD HOC FINANCIAL AID ISSUES WORKING
GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NCAA DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETE EXPERI-
ENCE COMMITTEE & DIVISION I COUNCIL  2 (Feb. 2016) [hereinafter AD HOC FINAN-
CIAL AID ISSUES COMMITTEE REPORT], https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
DIFAIWG_Rec_DICouncil_Student-Athlete-Experience_Com_20160215.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/QB6G-FRTG] (observing that after the adoption of cost of attendance,
many schools questioned “whether unintended consequences existed and should be
addressed”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 3 (expressing fears that such student-athletes would “otherwise
choose to attend and participate at a different school if not for access to additional
financial aid” at the higher-resourced school).
171. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 15.5.3.1.2 (capping the number
of equivalent financial aid awards in the sport of women’s softball at 12).
172. $4,000 per scholarship X 12 total scholarship equivalencies = $48,000. In effect,
a total of $48,000 will be added to the scholarship “pot” for the school’s softball pro-
gram, and there are no limits on the total number of potential scholarship recipients,
or counters, for the sport. For a general discussion of scholarships in equivalency
sports, see Danny Belch, Belch: NCAA Scholarship System is Unjust, THE STANFORD
DAILY (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2010/02/05/belch-ncaa-scholar
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could then be distributed to the previous roster (or an equal number
of counters) to increase each aid award. This was the likely intent
when cost of attendance was adopted, although most of the focus was
on head count sports such as football and men’s basketball. The con-
cern previously identified, however, is that Big State could instead use
that $48,000 to increase the size of its roster of softball student-ath-
letes who receive athletics financial aid by putting more than twenty-
four student-athletes on partial scholarships.173
After its initial review, the Ad Hoc Financial Aid Issues Working
Group submitted two options to the full Council for consideration: (1)
to gather data and monitor the implementation of the legislation in
equivalency sports over a two–three year period, or (2) to adopt fur-
ther legislation that would require a proportionate increase to each
student-athlete’s equivalency scholarship.174 After reviewing and con-
sidering the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations, in April 2016,
the Council approved the first option “to gather data and monitor the
application of the . . . [cost of attendance] financial aid legislation”
over the ensuing two years.175 In particular, the Council directed the
monitoring of the following four financial aid elements: “[1] counter
numbers per sport; [2] average equivalency percent awarded per
counter per sport; [3] roster numbers per sport; and [4] average total
financial aid expenditure per institution per sport.”176 A data review
of trend comparisons for the two years prior to and the two years
following the adoption of the cost of attendance legislation is sched-
uled to be completed by March 2018 and available to the Council in
April 2018.177 The Council expanded the intended analysis to include
a “comprehensive review of financial aid legislation.”178 One possible
ship-system-is-unjust/ [https://perma.cc/GQ49-28N2] (providing an analysis of scholar-
ship distributions in equivalency sports).
173. See AD HOC FINANCIAL AID ISSUES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 166, at 3
(describing concerns about roster creep and counter creep).
174. See id. at 4–5 (setting forth both alternatives). As to the latter alternative, for
example, if a student-athlete was previously on a 25% scholarship, she should also
receive 25% of the additional amount beyond tuition, fees, books, room and board
necessary for full cost of attendance at the university.
175. NCAA, REPORT OF THE NCAA DIVISION I COUNCIL & SEVEN COUNCIL
STANDING COMMITTEES 12 (Apr. 6–8, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
April2016DICouncil_Report_20160418.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZC7-ALTP]. As a
Council member, the Author of this Article was present for the discussion. Some
members expressed concern that it was premature to recommend legislation without
having the opportunity to collect and review data regarding actual implementation of
the new financial aid legislations.
176. Id.
177. NCAA, REPORT OF THE NCAA DIVISION I COUNCIL & COUNCIL STANDING
COMMITTEES 17 (June 26–28, 2017), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Jun2017DI
Council_Report_20170712.pdf [https://perma.cc/7229-MUZC].
178. Id. For example, one topic that will likely be on the table is the appropriate
number of counter student-athletes per equivalency sport. See NCAA Division I
Council Ad Hoc Financial Aid Issues Working Group, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
governance/working-groups/ncaa-division-i-council-ad-hoc-financial-aid-issues-work
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decision point for the Council will be whether to identify and legislate
the number of student-athletes permitted to be on scholarship (“coun-
ters”) for each equivalency sport. For example, in baseball, there is a
legislated cap of twenty-seven student-athlete counters who may re-
ceive athletics financial aid (and 11.7 scholarship equivalencies).179
Separate from the narrower issue of how to apply or regulate cost
of attendance dollars in equivalency sports, a second issue pertaining
to equivalency sports relates directly to the caps on the number of
scholarships themselves. A comprehensive review of financial aid in
equivalency sports should include an examination of the current maxi-
mum equivalency limits in equivalency sports and recommendations
for increases.180 These limits should be increased with the ultimate
goal of making all sports head count sports. The time commitments
for a typical DI student-athlete for athletics and academics are compa-
rable regardless of whether the student-athlete participates in a head
count or equivalency sport.181 A commitment to the collegiate model
of intercollegiate athletics suggests that each student-athlete’s scholar-
ship opportunities should be comparable regardless of the student-
athlete’s sport.
The price tag involved in increasing scholarship numbers in
equivalency sports, however, would be significant. For example, sup-
pose that Big State University currently provides the maximum per-
mitted number of scholarships in eight equivalency sports. If the
NCAA adopted legislation to permit just three additional scholarships
for each equivalency sport, that would result in a total of twenty-four
additional scholarship equivalencies.182 Suppose further that the an-
nual cost of attendance at Big State University is $30,000. This means
that funding the additional twenty-four scholarships during the first
year would cost $720,000.183 Although Autonomy 5 conferences and
ing-group [https://perma.cc/Q477-VDSD] (last visited Aug. 9, 2017) (including the
“number of scholarship student-athletes” per sport as an element of the review).
179. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 15.5.4 (providing for “an annual
limit of 11.7 on the value of financial aid awards (equivalencies) to counters and an
annual limit of twenty-seven on the total number of counters in baseball”).
180. See id. § 15.5.3.1 (setting forth maximum scholarship limits in equivalency
sports).
181. See Greg Johnson, Third GOALS Survey Findings Unveiled, NCAA (Jan. 14,
2016), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/third-goals-survey-
findings-unveiled [https://perma.cc/9KN7-GSCS] (summarizing that on average DI
student-athletes reported spending thirty-four hours per week on their sports and 38.5
hours per week on academics).
182. 8 X 3 = 24.
183. 24 X $30,000 = $720,000. Overall budgeted scholarship costs would increase, as
well, over the next several years if Big State University opts to continue funding the
twenty-four additional scholarships for each ensuing class, until leveling off once the
initial group of twenty-four scholarship student-athletes begins to graduate. In addi-
tion, given Title IX considerations, half of the twenty-four new scholarship
equivalencies should be made available in women’s sports. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681
(2017) (requiring institutions to provide an equality of opportunities for both sexes in
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their member schools would have the resources for significant in-
creases in the number of equivalency scholarships if permitted by the
NCAA bylaws, many schools in other conferences would likely balk at
the attendance costs. Moreover, this portion of the NCAA bylaws is
subject to shared governance voting, and is not in an area of auton-
omy.184 As previous research has revealed, division-wide legislation
has not generally fared well when the DI proposal would increase
costs.185 Accordingly, adopting Council legislation to increase scholar-
ships in equivalency sports could be challenging given the associated
costs.186 If there is a lack of willingness across DI to adopt legislation
to increase the number of scholarships in equivalency sports, however,
there is a mechanism included within the revised governance structure
to permit an addition to the current areas of autonomy.187 This would
require a recommendation to the DI Board of Directors supported by
at least three of the Autonomy 5 conferences, and a 60% or greater
vote of the “president or chancellor members of the Board of
Directors.”188
3. Nimble Governance
One of the stated goals of the NCAA DI governance overhaul was
to create “a new governance structure that will enable it [DI] to oper-
ate in a more nimble and streamlined manner, and to be more respon-
sive to membership needs throughout the division, particularly those
of student-athletes.”189 In many ways, that goal has been realized. In-
stead of separate Leadership and Legislative Councils with sometimes
intercollegiate sports). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 110; U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., supra note 110 (providing general overviews of Title IX and its application to
most educational programs, including intercollegiate athletics).
184. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 15.5 (not listing the provisions
relating to counters and equivalency sports as being in an area of autonomy).
185. See Potuto, Dillon, & Clough, supra note 19, at 3 (finding cost of implementing
a proposal to be statistically significant as to whether it is adopted or fails).
186. The fact of weighted voting among Council representatives, however, could
contribute to the potential for success of any such measure. See NCAA MANUAL
2017–18, supra note 4, § 4.3.4 (delineating the weighted voting for each Council
representative).
187. See id. § 5.3.2.1.2.1 (providing a procedure for adding to the areas of
autonomy).
188. Id. In addition, any such addition “must permit the use of resources to advance
the legitimate educational or athletics-related needs of student-athletes, support legis-
lative changes that will otherwise enhance student-athlete well-being, or complement
and align with the values of higher education.” Id. at 5.3.2.1.2.2. Adding to the num-
ber of equivalency scholarships would certainly be encompassed within this standard.
189. See RECOMMENDED MODEL, supra note 13, at 5. See also Hosick, supra note
41 (quoting DI Board Steering Committee member Kirk Schulz hopes the future of
NCAA governance will be described as, “nimble, strategic, collaborative, [and]
transparent”).
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overlapping responsibilities, DI now has a single governing Council.190
Instead of dueling academic committees, the structure includes a sin-
gle Committee on Academics.191 Key substructure committees report
directly to the Council and include Council representatives among
their members.192 Moreover, the Autonomy 5 conferences have sepa-
rate autonomous authority over certain policy issues.
Despite the significant improvements, however, there are still chal-
lenges. For example, the Autonomy 5 conferences hold a business ses-
sion to adopt autonomy legislation only once per year.193 In turn, the
Council has averaged five meetings per year since its formation in Jan-
uary 2015.194 Typically, Council legislation is also adopted on an an-
nual basis at the DI Council’s April meeting.195 With such a large
membership organization involving hundreds of universities, immedi-
ate regulatory action is challenging, if not, at times, seemingly impossi-
ble.196 On the other hand, the Council and the DI Board each have
the ability to adopt emergency legislation.197 These emergency mecha-
nisms allow for prompt action on an as-needed basis. Given the dispa-
rate membership across DI, a regulatory process that is deliberative
and that allows for member comment and involvement is generally
positive despite the time that is often necessary for legislative action.
190. Compare NCAA MANUAL 2014–15, supra note 28, §§ 4.5.1, 4.6.1 (defining the
former Leadership and Legislative Councils), with NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra
note 4, § 4.3.1 (describing the current governing Council).
191. See id. § 4.4 (describing the Committee on Academics).
192. See DI Council Substructure, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI
%20Council%20Substructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MU3-P7WJ] (last visited Aug. 8,
2017) (providing a chart depicting the standing committees that report to the Council,
along with information about their membership).
193. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.7 (describing Autonomy
5 voting process at annual business session).
194. See Division I Council, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/
division-i-council [https://perma.cc/P544-T3LK] (last visited Aug. 8, 2017) (providing a
list of Council meetings for 2015–17 and links to meeting reports).
195. See, e.g., NCAA, REPORT OF THE NCAA DIVISION I COUNCIL AND COUNCIL
STANDING COMMITTEES, at 1 & Attachment A (Apr. 12–14, 2017), http://www.ncaa.
org/sites/default/files/April2017DICouncil_Report_20170425.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ADT8-ETAG] (listing legislative actions).
196. Consider, however, Professor Potuto’s analysis that there is often a regulatory
mentality that pervades NCAA legislative activities, and that member-schools are
often too quick to propose rule changes when they do not like a certain practice or
practices. See Potuto, Two, Four, Six, Eight, supra note 12, at 293–97.
197. See NCAA MANUAL 2017–18, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.2.1.1 (permitting the Coun-
cil to “adopt emergency or noncontroversial legislation during any meeting by at least
a three-fourths of its members present and voting”); id. § 4.2.2 (allowing the DI Board
to adopt emergency legislation “in circumstances in which significant values are at
stake or the use of the regular legislative process is likely to cause significant harm or
hardship to the Association or the Division I membership because of the delay in its
effective date”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL103.txt unknown Seq: 39 22-DEC-17 12:04
2017] NCAA DIVISION I GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 103
IV. CONCLUSION
The late 2014 overhaul of the NCAA DI governance structure has
largely been a positive development for the DI membership. The new
authority vested in the Autonomy 5 conferences and member-schools
created opportunities to provide better scholarship benefits to stu-
dent-athletes and facilitated the development of meaningful time de-
mands reforms.  For now, at least, the bifurcated structure within DI
of certain policy areas falling within the authority of the Autonomy 5
conferences and the remaining bylaws governing DI being under the
purview of the Council has worked. The model provides a framework
for schools and conferences of significantly different levels of re-
sources to continue to be affiliated as part of the same division. Al-
though certain challenges continue to exist and more will no doubt
appear on the horizon, the revamped governance structure provides a
more effective and responsive means to govern DI athletics on behalf
of student-athletes.
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